政府创新补贴、产品异质性与社会福利问题——基于寡占竞争模型的理论研究

Research on the Interaction of Government Innovation Subsidy,Product Heterogeneity and Social Welfare——A Theoretical Study Based on Oligopoly Competition Model

本文基于我国国有企业管理制度的现状,通过构建混合寡占竞争模型,假设企业技术创新能降低单位成本,揭示了政府创新研发补贴、企业产品异质性、企业技术进步创新程度与社会总福利之间的内在关系与作用机理。研究表明:(1)当存在政府对国有企业实行创新研发补贴政策时,产品异质性系数越低,政府创新研发补贴系数越高,企业技术进步创新程度越大,则社会总福利水平越高;(2)企业的最优技术进步创新程度随着产品异质性系数的增加而降低,随着政府补贴力度的增加而增加。

Based on the management system of state-owned enterprises in China,this paper aims to reveal the intrinsic relationship between government R&D innovation subsidies,product heterogeneity,enterprise technological innovation and social welfare by constructing a mixed oligopoly competition model and assuming that technological innovation can reduce unit costs.It’s found that:(1)when the subsidy policy for state-owned enterprises is implemented,the lower the coefficient of product heterogeneity,the higher the coefficient of government R&D innovation subsidy,and the greater the degree of enterprise technological innovation,and the higher the level of social welfare;(2)The optimal technological innovation degree of enterprises decreases with the increase of product heterogeneity coefficient,and increases with the increase of government subsidies.