摘要
为了鼓励施工企业在施工过程中选择安全施工并尽量避免安全事故发生,本文建立了一个关于政府-建设单位-施工单位的三方演化博弈模型,综合分析考虑了影响各方行为策略的因素。根据所建立的复制动态方程,研究了三者策略选择的演化过程,得到了6种具体情形下的演化稳定策略并利用现实数据结合软件进行了仿真分析。研究表明:政府有关部门的奖惩机制、政府及建设单位的监督行为、安全事故发生概率和违规操作被发现的概率等18个因素会直接或间接影响三方的策略选择。通过改善奖惩机制、加强监督效率、降低安全事故发生概率等手段能有效地促进安全施工进行。本文能为提高我国的安全施工水平提供建议,有利于安全施工进行。
In order to encourage construction companies to choose safe construction and try to avoid safety accidents in the construction process. This paper establishes a three-party evolutionary game model of he government-constructor-construction unit. It considers the factors affecting the behavioral strategies of each party in a comprehensive analysis. Based on the replicated dynamic equations, the evolutionary process of the strategy choice of the three parties is studied, and the evolutionary stabilization strategies are obtained for six specific situations and simulated using realistic data and software. The study shows that 18 factors, including the reward and punishment mechanism of relevant government departments, the supervision behavior of government and construction units, the probability of safety accidents and the probability of irregularities being detected, directly or indirectly affect the strategy choice of the three parties. By improving the reward and punishment mechanism, enhancing supervision efficiency, and reducing the probability of safety accidents, safe construction can be effectively promoted. This paper can provide suggestions to improve the level of safe construction in China and facilitate safe construction to be carried out.
作者
邢维肖
王军武
XING Weixiao;WANG Junwu(School of Civil Engineering and Architecture,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China;Sanya Urban Planning and Design Institute Co Ltd,Sanya 572000,China)
出处
《土木工程与管理学报》
2022年第5期127-135,共9页
Journal of Civil Engineering and Management
基金
国家重点研发计划项目(2018YFC0704301)
武汉市城乡建设局科技研究计划项目(201943)。
关键词
安全施工
三方演化博弈
仿真分析
监督行为
奖惩机制
safe construction
trilateral evolutionary game
simulation analysis
supervision behavior
reward and punishment mechanism