胡塞尔、海德格尔和马里翁对“我思”问题的反思和阐释

Reflective Interpretations of Husserl,Heidegger and Marion on the Question of“Cogito”

笛卡尔为把握知识确然性而提出了“我思故我在”这一命题,该命题也成为整个西方近现代哲学命运的浓缩。本文试图探究胡塞尔、海德格尔、马里翁这三位具有代表性的现象学家如何分别以超越论还原、存在论还原、爱洛斯还原的方式反思和阐释“我思”问题。在以这一问题简史为核心的现象学进程中,现象学在对“我思”的回应中呈现出不同的形态,超越论还原以纯粹意识为奠基,存在论还原以“我在”为最终溯源,爱洛斯还原则以“去爱的自我”为最终目的。在这一进程中,先前的后续的现象学家同时对先前的现象学家就此问题的思考予以了评价,因此,本文还简短讨论了马里翁在讨论胡塞尔和海德格尔所理解的“我思”问题时,在何种程度上达到了内在批评所需要的明见性和合理性。

In order to define the boundary of knowledge,Descartes put forward the notion“Cogito ergo sum”,which thereafter was regarded as the embodiment of the fate of modern Western philosophy.This research attempts to clarify three different reflective interpretations of“Cogito”,that is,specifically,from three different perspectives,Husserl s transcendent reduction,Heidegger s ontological reduction,and Marion s Eros reduction.In the phenomenological process centered on this brief history of the notion,phenomenology takes different forms in its response to“Cogito”.Transcendental reduction takes“pure consciousness”as the foundation.Ontological reduction takes“Ichheit”as the ultimate source.Eros reduction takes“ego amans”as the mission.In the phenomenological process,the notion,“Cogito”,manifests various forms and,at the same time,these phenomenologists made their criticism on this notion in the previous studies.Therefore,this research also discusses Marion s use of the evidence and rationality required for the immanent critique to address the problem of“Cogito”as understood by Husserl and Heidegger.