连锁股东能否提高企业信息披露质量?

Can a Chain of Shareholders Improve the Quality of Corporate Disclosure?

连锁股东在新兴的资本市场中日益流行和普遍,其经济后果引起了学术界和实务界的普遍关注。基于此,本文以信息披露质量为研究视角,利用2007—2019年我国A股上市公司的数据进行实证检验,研究连锁股东对信息披露质量的影响及其作用渠道。研究发现,连锁股东能够提高企业信息披露质量。作用渠道分析表明,连锁股东通过降低产品市场竞争程度和监督管理层行为提高企业信息披露质量。进一步检验结果表明,在连锁股东的市场势力较强、企业会计错报较高以及非国有企业中,连锁股东对信息披露质量的提高效应更为明显。本文丰富了连锁股东对企业行为影响的实证研究,为决策部门针对性地制定提高企业信息披露质量、促进资本市场有序健康发展的政策方案提供了有益的参考。

The economic consequences of chain shareholders,which are increasingly popular and widespread in the emerging capital market,have attracted widespread attention from both academic and practical circles.Based on this,this paper examines the impact of chain shareholders on the quality of information disclosure and its channels of action by using data of A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2019 as a research perspective.The study found that chain shareholders can improve the quality of corporate disclosure.The effect channel analysis shows that chain shareholders improve the quality of corporate disclosure by reducing the level of competition in the product market and monitoring management behavior.Further tests show that the effect of chain shareholders on disclosure quality is more pronounced in firms with stronger market power of chain shareholders,higher corporate accounting misstatements,and non-state enterprises.This paper enriches the empirical research on the influence of chain shareholders on corporate behavior,and provides useful references for policy-making departments to target policy solutions to improve the quality of corporate information disclosure and promote the orderly and healthy development of the capital market.