耕地保护内卷化的形成原因与优化机制

The Formation Reason and Optimization Mechanism of Cultivated Land Protection Involution

利益关系是耕地保护治理的核心问题。在耕地保护过程中,中央政府面临生态利益与政策惯性难以统一的内卷,地方政府面临政治利益与科层体系互为传导的内卷,农户面临生存利益与经济理性均衡决策的内卷,三方利益诉求非一致性引致的多重利益格局造成了耕地保护内卷化的制约困境。故此,应将耕地保护置于多维激励视角中进行探析,去内卷化依赖于中央政府、地方政府、农户三大主体的合作与博弈。基于此,立足于耕地保护治理中参与主体利益非一致性这一视角,提出“价值”“行为”“绩效”三重激励维度,建构以制度创新激励为外部推力、经济补偿激励为内部拉力、价值自律激励为核心动力、多元协同激励为根本合力的“四力融合”激励型协同去内卷化的治理体系。

Interest relationship is the core issue of cultivated land protection and governance.In the process of cultivated land protection,the central government is faced with the contradiction between ecological interests and policy inertia;the local govern-ment is faced with the mutual transmission of political interests and bureaucratic system;farmers are faced with the involution of the balanced decision-making of survival interests and economic rationality.The multiple interest pattern caused by the inconsistency of the three parties′interest demands shapes the constraint dilemma of involution of cultivated land protection.Therefore,the cultivated land protection should be analyzed from the perspective of multi-dimensional incentive,and the de-involution effect depends on the cooperation and game among the central government,local government and farmers.Based on this,this paper puts forward three in-centive dimensions of“value”,“practice”and“performance”from the perspective of non-uniformity of interests of participants in cultivated land protection and governance,and constructs an incentive collaborative de-involution governance system with institutional innovation as the external thrust,economic compensation as the internal pulling force,compensation as the internal driving force,value self-discipline incentive as the core driving force,and multiple cooperative excitation as the fundamental resultant force.