控股股东股权质押、机构投资者与企业非效率投资

Controlling Shareholders’ Equity Pledge,Institutional Investors and Inefficient Investment of Enterprises

选取创业板上市公司数据,实证检验控股股东股权质押对企业非效率投资的影响以及机构投资者持股比例对两者关系的调节作用。研究表明:上市公司普遍存在非效率投资问题,即投资不足和投资过度并存;随着控股股东股权质押比例的增加,企业非效率投资问题更加严重;机构投资者持股可减弱控股股东股权质押对企业非效率投资的影响,但是这种调节作用并不显著。

This paper selects the data of GEM listed companies to empirically test the impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on enterprises’ inefficient investment and the moderating effect of institutional investors’ shareholding ratio on the relationship between the two.The research shows that inefficient investment is common in listed companies,that is,underinvestment and overinvestment coexist;With the increase of the proportion of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge,the problem of inefficient investment becomes more serious;Institutional investors’ shareholding can weaken the impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on enterprises’ inefficient investment,although the regulatory effect is not significant.