管理层持股、短视主义与公司成长--基于沪深A股数据的实证分析

Management Ownership,Shortsightedness and Company Growth:An Empirical Analysis Based on Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share Data

以2012-2021年沪深A股上市公司为样本,采用有调节的中介效应模型实证检验了管理层持股、短视主义与公司成长之间的关系。研究发现:管理层持股与公司成长显著正相关,短视主义与公司成长显著负相关,三者之间的作用机理体现为显著的部分中介效应。管理层持股能够抑制短视主义,因而促进公司成长,且这一中介作用的前半路径受到管理层过度自信的反向调节,这充分表明管理层过度自信会弱化管理层持股对短视主义的抑制效果。进一步研究发现:管理层持股、短视主义与公司成长的中介作用路径在非国有公司更加显著;机构投资者持股和社会关系质量能正向调节管理层持股对公司成长的直接促进作用。

Using Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2021 as a sample,the paper empirically tests the relationship among management ownership,shortsightedness and company growth with moderated mediation effect model.Empirical research finds that management ownership has a significant positive correlation with company growth,while shortsightedness has a significant negative correlation with company growth,the mechanism of action among the three is manifested as a significant partial mediation effect.Management ownership can restrict shortsightedness,thus promoting company growth,and the first half of this mediating effect is negatively moderated by management overconfidence,which fully indicates that management overconfidence will weaken the restrictive effect of management ownership on shortsightedness.Further research finds that the intermediary path among managerial ownership,shortsightedness and company growth existed in non-state-owned companies more significantly;Institutional ownership and the quality of social relations can positively moderate the direct promotion effect of management ownership on company growth.