Bi-Level Programming for the Optimal Nonlinear Distance-Based Transit Fare Structure Incorporating Principal-Agent Game

The urban transit fare structure and level can largely affect passengers’travel behavior and route choices.The commonly used transit fare policies in the present transit network would lead to the unbalanced transit assignment and improper transit resources distribution.In order to distribute transit passenger flow evenly and efficiently,this paper introduces a new distance-based fare pattern with Euclidean distance.A bi-level programming model is developed for determining the optimal distance-based fare pattern,with the path-based stochastic transit assignment(STA)problem with elastic demand being proposed at the lower level.The upper-level intends to address a principal-agent game between transport authorities and transit enterprises pursing maximization of social welfare and financial interest,respectively.A genetic algorithm(GA)is implemented to solve the bi-level model,which is verified by a numerical example to illustrate that the proposed nonlinear distance-based fare pattern presents a better financial performance and distribution effect than other fare structures.