行政处罚对银行风险承担的影响:仅罚机构还是兼罚责任人?

Impact of Administrative Penalty on Bank Risk-taking:Institution Penalty Only or the Person Liable Penalty As Well?

立足于我国监管部门大力整治银行业市场乱象的现状,文章系统梳理了不同类型行政处罚对银行风险承担的影响机制,并利用手工整理的2008—2018年银行行政处罚数据,对理论假说进行实证检验。经验结果显示,“仅机构处罚”不能显著降低银行风险承担水平,“双罚”可以有效抑制银行风险承担,并且这种抑制作用具有长期效应。异质性检验表明,“双罚”对大银行、国有银行和全国性银行风险的抑制作用更明显。机制检验发现,减少理财产品、同业业务等影子银行规模是“双罚”降低银行风险承担的重要渠道。研究还发现,随着责任人处罚严厉程度的上升,“双罚”对银行风险承担的抑制效果越好。政策启示在于,加大责任人问责力度,整治影子银行乱象,是监管部门防范银行风险的关键所在。

Based on the current situation that regulatory authorities are vigorously rectifying the chaos in the banking market,this paper systematically analyzes the transmission channels of different types of administrative penalties on bank risk-taking,and examines it by using the hand-collected data on bank administrative penalty from 2008 to 2018.Empirical results show that“the institutional penalty only”has no significant impact on bank risk-taking,but“bipartite penalty”can significantly reduce bank risk-taking,and it has long-term effects.Heterogeneity test shows that“bipartite penalty”can reduce bank risk-taking more obviously in large-scale banks,state-owned banks and national banks.Mechanism test shows that“bipartite penalty”can reduce bank risk-taking mainly by shrinking shadow-banking financial services such as wealth management products and interbank business.In addition,with the increasing of the severity of personnel penalty,the“bipartite penalty”can reduce bank risk-taking more effectively.The policy implication is that increasing the severity of personnel penalty and rectifying the chaos of shadow banking are the keys for regulatory authorities to prevent bank risks.