售装分离供应链的在线销售策略选择——独立、捆绑还是混合?

Online Selling Strategy Selection in a Sales and After-sales Services Separated Supply Chain——Separate, Bundled or Mixed?

在线上售装分离销售模式下,针对单B2C平台、单产品零售商和单安装服务商构成的供应链系统,分别构建了独立定价、纯捆绑定价和混合捆绑定价下平台主导的三方博弈模型,发现各销售策略下两类平台佣金弹性系数及产品基础市场份额变化均会显著影响到三方成员的决策和收益。比较不同销售策略下的均衡结果,发现零售商采取独立定价总是优于纯捆绑定价;系统参数满足特定条件时,纯捆绑定价对平台是占劣策略,而独立定价是占优策略。进一步引入数值算例,发现:在现有参数条件下,平台和零售商采取独立定价均是占优策略,而服务商采取纯捆绑定价是占优策略。因此,售装分离模式下,各成员对于销售策略选取的偏好不同,进而导致三方之间存在利益冲突,具体采取何种销售策略取决于平台努力成本系数及产品基础市场份额等参数。

Under a sales mode with online sales and after-sales services separated, considering a supply chain composed of a B2 C platform, a product retailer, and an after-sales service provider, we construct a tripartite game model dominated by the platform under separate pricing, pure bundling pricing and mixed bundling pricing, respectively. Research shows that two types of the commission elasticity coefficient and the products’ market share under each selling strategy will significantly affect the decision-making and revenues of three parties. Comparing the equilibrium results under different selling strategies, we find that separate pricing is always better than pure-bundling pricing for the retailer. When system parameters meet certain conditions, mixed-bundling pricing is a dominant strategy for the platform, while pure-bundling strategy is a less dominant one. Numerical examples are further introduced, from which we find that under the existing parameter conditions, separate pricing is the dominant strategy for the platform and the retailer, while pure-bundling pricing is the dominant strategy for the service provider. Therefore, under the sales mode with online sales and after-sales services separated, each member has different preferences for the selling strategy selection, which leads to conflicts of interests among the three parties. The selling strategy selection depends on some parameters such as the platform’s effort cost coefficient and the products’ market share.