上下游型跨界流域水资源重复博弈及策略--以咸海流域为例

Study on repeated game and strategy of transboundary basin water resources for the up-down type of international rivers:taking the Aral Sea Basin as an example

以跨界水问题突出的中亚咸海流域为例,对上下游国家进行了不同水资源策略下的无限次重复博弈分析,并进行参数分析验证其合理性。结果表明:无限次重复博弈可为破解跨界水合作困境提供有效出路。在无限次重复博弈中,不论采用何种博弈策略,耐心程度都是开展跨界水合作的基础。引入惩罚项的博弈策略,使得博弈双方达成合作的可能性更大;博弈双方重视未来利益且在一定约束机制的条件下,将倾向选择合作策略。突破跨界水治理困境、实现流域可持续发展需要流域国家从流域整体利益最大化角度提升互信、寻找共同利益交汇点和利益平衡点,必要时可通过流域机构进行协调并对双方行为进行约束。

The Aral Sea Basin in Central Asia where transboundary water problems are prominent has been chosen as an example,the infinite repeated game under different water resources strategies among upstream and downstream countries have been analyzed,and a parametric analysis has been carried out to verify its rationality.The results show that the infinite repeated game can provide an effective solution to the dilemma of transboundary water cooperation.In the infinite repetition game,regardless of the game strategy,the degree of patience is the basis for transboundary water cooperation.The game strategy of introducing penalty make it more likely that both parties to reach cooperation;both parties pay attention to future benefits and under certain constraints,will tend to choose a cooperative strategy.To break through the dilemma of transboundary water governance and realize the sustainable development of the basin,it is necessary for the basin countries to enhance mutual trust from the perspective of maximizing the overall interests of the basin,to find the intersection of common interests and balance of interests,and to coordinate and restrain the behavior of both parties through the basin institutions when necessary.