基于政府补贴的养老机构服务外包博弈模型

A Game Model of Service Outsourcing of Pension Institutions Based on Government Subsidies

文章主要研究了在政府补贴下,养老机构与私人企业各自对提供高质量服务水平所做努力的最优决策问题,建立了政府补贴养老机构以及养老机构与私人企业利润共享情况下的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,采用逆向归纳法求解出养老机构市场定价和提高服务水平所做努力、承包养老机构服务外包的私人企业所做努力以及政府补贴,并计算出机构最优利润和政府最大社会福利,为这三级供应链的主体在提高养老服务质量和刺激养老市场需求量的问题上提供基础的理论指导.

This paper mainly studies the optimal decision-making problem of pension institutions and private enterprises’respective efforts to provide high-quality services under government subsidies,and establishes a Stackelberg master-slave game model under the condition of government subsidized pension institutions and profit sharing between pension institutions and private enterprises.The reverse induction method is used to solve the market pricing of pension institutions and the efforts made to improve the service level,the efforts made by private enterprises contracting the service outsourcing of pension institutions and the government subsidies,and the optimal profit of the institution and the maximum social welfare of the government is also calculated,that provides basic theoretical guidance for the subjects of the three-tier supply chain to improve the quality of pension services and stimulate the demand of the pension market.