财政分权、税收竞争与经济增长

Fiscal decentralization,tax competition and economic growth

利用中国31个省份2007—2019年的面板数据对全国以及东部地区、中部地区和西部地区三大区域的财政分权、税收竞争与经济增长展开实证研究,再利用门槛模型对三者之间的非线性关系进行进一步探析。结果发现:整体来看,财政分权会促进中国经济增长,而税收竞争则产生抑制作用。分区域来看,财政分权对三大地区的经济增长均为积极作用但程度各不相同;税收竞争有利于东部地区的经济增长,但对中部地区和西部地区却产生负作用。而通过研究交互项,发现财政分权能够缓解中部地区和西部地区恶性的税收竞争从而对经济产生正效应。同时,门槛效应模型结果显示,财政分权度的高低一定程度上影响着税收竞争对经济增长发挥的作用。

Based on the panel data of 31 provinces in China from 2007 to 2019,this paper makes an empirical study of fiscal decentralization,tax competition and economic growth in China and three major regions,i.e.the eastern,central and western regions,and further analyzes the nonlinear relationship among them with the threshold model.The results show that,on the whole,fiscal decentralization will promote China’s economic growth while tax competition will restrain China’s economic growth.From the regional point of view,fiscal decentralization has a significant role in promoting the economic growth of three regions,but the effects are different.Tax competition promotes the economic growth in the eastern region,but it has a negative effect on the economic growth in the central and western regions.By studying the interaction between fiscal decentralization and tax competition,it finds that fiscal decentralization can alleviate the vicious tax competition in the central and western regions,which has a positive effect on the economy.At the same time,the results of threshold effect model show that the degree of fiscal decentralization will affect the effect of tax competition on economic growth to a certain extent.