带量采购政策下制药企业投标过程中的价格决策分析——基于博弈论的视角

Analysis of Price Decision in Bidding Process of Pharmaceutical Enterprises under Quantitative Purchasing Policy:From the perspective of game theory

药品集中带量采购政策是中国医疗体制改革的重大举措,目的在于通过以“量”换“价”的方式,降低药品价格。采用不完全信息静态博弈和序贯博弈分析制药企业如何在投标过程中做出最优报价决策。结果表明:制药企业成本越低,最优投标报价策略下所实现的收益越高;参与竞争的制药企业越少,最优投标报价策略下所实现的收益越高;政府采购价格为顶价A与制药企业成本C的一半。基于研究结论,为完善药品集中带量采购政策,推进政企之间的利益均衡提出几点可行性建议。

The policy of centralized procurement of drugs is an important measure in the reform of China’s medical system,and the purpose is to reduce the price of drugs by exchanging“quantity”for“price”.The static game and sequential game of incomplete information are used to analyze how to make the optimal quotation decision in the bidding process of pharmaceutical enterprises.The results show that the lower the cost of pharmaceutical enterprises,the higher the income realized under the optimal bidding strategy.The fewer pharmaceutical enterprises participating in the competition,the higher the returns realized under the optimal bidding strategy.The government purchase price is half of the top price A and the cost C of pharmaceutical companies.Based on the conclusions of the study,in order to improve the policy of centralized drug procurement and promote the balance of interests between government and enterprises,some feasible suggestions are put forward.