中央绩效考核与地方民生治理:迎风而动还是岿然不动

Swing with Wind or Remain Firm?A Study on the Central Performance Appraisal and Local People’s Livelihood Governance

基于2006年后各地区渐次推进的干部绩效考核改革实践,本文采用多期差分模型考察了中央绩效考核调整对地方官员民生治理的影响。结果显示,中央绩效考核改革显著推升了地方官员对教育、医疗等民生供给的治理关注,并一定程度上抑制了官员的“增长锦标赛”偏好,凸显科学发展观调控的显著成效;从区际互动视角看,地方官员的民生治理动机在辖区间存在显著的策略模仿,考核进一步促进了竞争性地区官员的治理努力;机制分析表明,中央驱动地方民生考核的治理转向,主要通过内在的政治晋升、外在的地区竞争以及财政压力约束来实现。从实际效果看,整体上,官员民生治理动机的矫正显著影响了地方政府对不同类型公共物品的投资支出,并切实提高了社会发展领域的民生福祉。本文的研究为后续调整优化地方干部考核中的官员激励提供了经验证据和有益借鉴。

Based on the progressive practice of local performance appraisal reform since 2006,this paper evaluates the impact of central performance appraisal of local government motivation on economic development and livelihoods by using a staggered differences-in-differences(DID)model.The empirical results show that the reform significantly promotes the efforts of local officials on livelihood,such as education and medical care,while it also restrains the preference for“growth championship”to a certain extent,which highlights the strong effect of the scientific perspective on development.From the perspective of interregional interaction,there is a significant strategy imitation in different jurisdictions between local officials in relation to people’s livelihood governance motivation,and the“assessment”signal effectively promotes officials’governance efforts among competitive regions.The Analysis of the mechanism also implies that local officials primarily drive livelihood governance through internal political promotion,external regional competition and fiscal constraints.Regarding its actual effect,in general,the correction of the officials’governance motivation significantly affects local governments’decisions to invest in different types of public goods and effectively improve people’s livelihoods in the field of social development.Our study provides empirical evidence and useful references for a subsequent adjustment and optimization of the officials’incentive mechanism in the assessment of local cadres.