财政分权度与国有企业控制权配置——政府与市场边界迁移的理论与经验解释

Degree of Fiscal Decentralization and the Allocation of Control of State-Owned Enterprises:Theoretical and Empirical Explanations for the Migration of the Government-Market Boundary

围绕国有企业控制权的配置,构建中央政府与地方政府博弈的马尔科夫精炼均衡模型,在求解博弈均衡的基础上探究均衡迁移的内生性原因,为改革后中国财政分权度的变化与国有企业控制权的不同配置提供解释。研究发现:在改革初期,相对于市场,计划在资源配置中占绝对地位,此时为充分发挥国有企业的宏观调控职能以实现各自效用的最大化,中央政府实施财政分权,而地方政府则维持对国有企业的控制权;随着市场的发展,产品价格实现基本统一后,国有企业在产品市场上的宏观调控职能为以市场为媒介的财政政策、货币政策等所替代,此时的均衡路径为中央政府实施财政集权,而地方政府转移国有企业的控制权;亏损补贴和国民收入影响中央政府对财政分权度的选择,但推动均衡路径迁移的关键变量是市场化所决定的国家宏观调控参数。

After 1978,the national financial system was reformed from a“messing together”system to a graded lump-sum system,implying a shift from fiscal centralization to fiscal decentralization.However,the graded lump-sum system did not last forever,and the introduction of the tax sharing system in 1994 again centralized most of the fiscal power to the central government.After that,the government put forward the reform idea of restructuring major enterprises and relaxing control over small ones for state-owned enterprises(SOEs)in 1995,and implemented the reform of privatization of small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises,which set off a large-scale privatization wave.Understanding the relationship between the implementation of the tax sharing system and the privatization of SOEs is necessary for the subsequent reform of SOEs,thus deserves an in-depth discussion.This paper constructs a Markov perfect equilibrium model of the game between the central government and local governments around the allocation of SOE control.On the basis of solving the game equilibrium,it explores the endogenous causes of equilibrium migration,and provides explanations for changes in the degree of fiscal decentralization and the different allocations of SOE control in post-reform China.Research results are as follows.At the early stage of reform,the planned economy occupied an absolute position in resource allocation compared with the market economy.At this time,in order to give full play to the macro-regulation function of SOEs to maximize their respective utilities,the central government implemented fiscal decentralization,while local governments maintained control over SOEs.With the development of market economy,when the product prices were basically unified,the macro-regulation function of SOEs in the product market was replaced by market-mediated fiscal and monetary policies.The equilibrium path at this point was for the central government to implement fiscal centralization,while local governments to transfer control of SOEs.Deficit subsidies and national income influenced the central government’s choice of degree of fiscal decentralization,but the key variable driving the migration of the equilibrium path was the national macroeconomic parameters determined by marketization.Compared with previous literature,this paper expands in the following two aspects.First,it constructs the Markov perfect equilibrium model of the game between the central government and local governments by taking into account the multiple objectives of SOEs,such as fiscal revenue and macroeconomic regulation.In this model,participants’actions in a certain period depend on the state of the game in that period,independent of the historical actions of the game.This is different from the repeated games in which historical actions affect present and future strategies and the state of the stage remains unchanged.Second,it explores the endogenous causes of equilibrium migration on the basis of solving the game equilibrium.This can provide an explanation for changes in the degree of fiscal decentralization and the different allocations of SOE control in post-reform China,as well as an explanation based on empirical facts in China for the stability and dynamics of the government-market boundary.