巨灾保险参与主体行为的演化路径研究

A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Study of the Behavior of Catastrophe Insurance Participants

为分析巨灾保险参与主体之间的行为交互关系对巨灾保险市场发展的影响,本文构建了居民、地方政府和保险公司的三方随机演化博弈模型,并利用MATLAB进行情景模拟仿真。研究发现:初始参与意愿、补贴比例、“搭便车”收益、惩罚机制等因素是影响演化速度、结果的重要参数,其中存在随机干扰效应。模拟仿真结果发现,居民的购买意愿、惩罚机制会促使地方政府选择合作提供巨灾保险,而补贴比例、初始意愿的增加会促使保险公司选择合作策略,且保险公司与地方政府呈现出反向跟随趋势。因此,在巨灾保险制度试点阶段,可设计适当的惩罚机制和居民购买意愿引导机制,引导地方政府主动参与到巨灾保险体系完善过程中;同时,加大对巨灾保险市场培育力度,提高对保险公司激励程度,引导保险公司参与提供巨灾保险。

To analyze the influence of the interaction between the participants of catastrophe insurance on the development of the catastrophe insurance market, this paper constructed a three-party stochastic evolutionary game model of residents, local governments and insurance companies, and used MATLAB to simulate the scenarios.The results show that:(1) the local government′s subsidy ratio to residents, initial willingness to participate, "free-rider" income and the penalty mechanism are important parameters that affect the evolution speed and results, and there is a random interference effect;(2) through the simulation results, it is found that the residents′ purchase willingness and penalty mechanism will prompt the local government to choose cooperation strategy to provide catastrophe insurance, while the increase in the subsidy ratio and the initial willingness will prompt the insurance company to choose the cooperation strategy, and the insurer and local governments follow the trend in reverse.Therefore, in the pilot stage of the catastrophe insurance system, it is necessary to appropriately guide local governments to actively participate in the improvement of the catastrophe insurance system by designing an appropriate penalty mechanism and a guiding mechanism for residents′ purchase willingness.At the same time, enhancing the cultivation of the catastrophe insurance environment, improving the incentive level for insurance companies, and guiding insurance companies to participate in the provision of catastrophe insurance also necessary.