政策性负担与国有企业创新绩效--高管激励的调节效应

Policy Burden and Innovation Performance of State-owned Enterprises--Moderating Effect of Executive Incentives

以2012—2020年沪深A股主板国有企业为样本,深入探究政策性负担对国有企业创新绩效的影响,不同国有企业级别和功能定位下该影响的差异性以及高管激励的调节效应。研究结果表明:(1)政策性负担会对国有企业创新绩效带来显著不利影响;(2)相对于中央直属国企,政策性负担对地方国企创新绩效的不利影响更大;(3)相对于商业类国企,政策性负担对公益类国企创新绩效的不利影响更大;(4)高管激励对政策性负担与国有企业创新绩效的不利影响起到调节作用,持股激励和晋升激励会缓解该不利作用(持股激励更明显),而薪酬激励反而会加剧该不利影响。

Taking A-share listed state-owned enterprises(SOEs)on the main boards of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2012 to 2020 as samples,the impact of policy burden on the innovation performance of SOEs,the differences of the impact under different levels and functions of SOEs,and the moderating effect of executive incentives are explored.The results show that:(1)The policy burden has a significantly negative impact on the innovation performance of SOEs;(2)Compared with SOEs directly under the central government,the policy burden has a greater negative impact on the innovation performance of local SOEs;(3)Compared with commercial SOEs,the policy burden has a greater negative impact on the innovation performance of public welfare SOEs;(4)Executive incentives moderate the negative effects of the policy burden and innovation performance of SOEs,and stock ownership incentives and promotion incentives mitigate the negative effects(stock ownership incentives are more obvious),while compensation incentives aggravate the negative effects.