PPP项目合同履约中的机会主义风险及其防范--以不完全契约理论为分析视角

The Opportunistic Risk and Its Prevention in the Implementation of PPP Project Contract Taking Contractual Incompleteness Theory for Analytic Perspective

PPP项目合同所具有的不完全性有其自身独特的成因。在合同履约中政府方与社会资本方均存在机会主义风险,而双方的机会主义行为存在一定的关联度,PPP项目合同的不完全性为机会主义风险增添了可能性空间。就机会主义风险防范而言,应以立法理性弥补合同不完全性,增强PPP项目合同主体缔约能力,出台类型化的PPP项目示范合同文本,预先设计再谈判和再缔约机制,从而实现项目合同完全性提升;构建多元监管主体格局,前移审计端口,改进绩效评价及其兑现支付方法和提升监管智能化水平,从而实现合同监管机制优化;通过合理分配项目剩余控制权,建立健全信任机制和声誉机制,从而实现合同激励机制改进。

PPP project contract has incompleteness derived from its own unique reasons.In the course of contact implemented both the government side and the social capital side possibly do opportunistic behavior which is correlative to each other,and contractual incompleteness increase the possibility of opportunistic behavior.In terms of opportunistic risk prevention,first of all,it is necessary to improve the completeness of the project contract that we should make up for the contract incompleteness with legislative rationality,enhance the contracting ability of the contract subject of the PPP project,introduce the typed PPP project model contract text,pre-design contractual re-negotiation and re-contracting mechanism.It is necessary to realize the optimization of the contractual supervision mechanism that we should build a diversified regulatory subject pattern,move forward the audit ports,improve the performance evaluation and cash payment methods and improve the intelligent level of supervision.It is necessary to improve the contractual incentive mechanisms that we should improve the contract incentive mechanism that we should reasonably allocate the remaining control rights of the project,establish and improve the trust mechanism and reputation mechanism.And these ideas and measures are all necessary,effective,and feasible.