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基于系统动力学模型的旧工业建筑再生利用项目监管演化博弈研究 被引量:4

Research on evolutionary game of supervision of old industrial building recycling project based on SD model
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摘要 目前,在旧工业建筑再生利用过程中,存在程序不规范、违规建设监管不足等问题,严重影响了项目的效益和建设进度。为了解决以上问题,采用演化博弈方法对旧工业建筑再生利用项目监管机制的内在机理、利益相关者策略选择的影响因素展开了深入研究。首先,基于一定的假设条件和参数设定,建立了“政府-开发商-社会公众”3个利益主体之间的演化博弈模型;然后,通过不同策略下各主体的支付矩阵得到了复制动态方程,求解了三方利益主体的策略选择和均衡点;最后,构建了包含3个利益主体的系统动力学模型,利用Vensim PLE软件对博弈模型进行仿真模拟,深入研究了演化博弈模型中敏感参数对三方利益主体演化策略的影响。结果表明:政府策略选择对监管成本、媒体可信度、政府声誉损失值较为敏感;开发商策略选择对处罚力度、社会形象损失值较为敏感;社会公众策略选择对监管收益较为敏感。因此,在旧工业建筑再生利用过程中,应鼓励社会公众参与监管,并通过降低政府监管成本、提高开发商违规建设的惩罚力度及额外信誉损失、加强与舆论媒体的合作、提高舆论媒体可信度等方式,促进建立有效的项目监管机制。 Nowadays,in the process of rebuilding old industrial buildings,problems such as irregular procedures and insufficient supervision of illegal construction seriously affect the benefits and construction progress of the project.To solve the above problems,the evolutionary game method is adopted to conduct an in-depth study on the internal mechanism of the supervision mechanism of the recycling projects of old industrial buildings and the influencing factors of the strategy selection of stakeholders.Firstly,based on certain assumptions and parameter setting,the evolutionary game model among the three interest subjects of‘government-developer-social public’is established;Then,the replicating dynamic equation is obtained through the payment matrix of each agent under different strategies,and the strategy choice and equilibrium point of the three parties’stakeholders are solved;Finally,a system dynamics model containing three stakeholders is constructed.The game model is simulated by Vensim PLE software,and the influence of sensitive parameters in the evolutionary game model on the evolutionary strategy of the three stakeholders is deeply studied.The research results show that the government’s strategy choice is more sensitive to supervision costs,media credibility,and government reputation loss;The developer’s strategy choice is more sensitive to punishment and social image loss,and the public’s strategy choice is more sensitive to supervision benefits.Therefore,in the old industrial building recycling project,the public should be encouraged to participate in supervision.It is suggested to promote the establishment of an effective project supervision mechanism by reducing the cost of government supervision,increasing the punishment of developers for illegal construction and additional credibility loss,strengthening the cooperation with public opinion media,and improving the credibility of public opinion media.
作者 田卫 任秋实 王立杰 郭平 陈旭 TIAN Wei;REN Qiu-shi;WANG Li-jie;GUO Ping;CHEN Xu(School of Civil Engineering,Xi'an University of Architecture&Technology,Xi'an 710055,China)
出处 《安全与环境学报》 CAS CSCD 北大核心 2022年第5期2668-2676,共9页 Journal of Safety and Environment
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(51908452) 陕西省教育厅专项科研计划项目(18JK0470)。
关键词 安全社会工程 旧工业建筑 监管机制 演化博弈 系统动力学模型 safety social engineering old industrial building supervision mechanism evolutionary game SD model
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