摘要
基于“固定资产投资—流动负债”的敏感度框架,本文以2015年逐步推向全国的地方政府债务管理体制改革为一项准自然实验,系统考察了地方政府债务治理对企业投融资期限错配的影响。双重差分估计显示,地方政府债务管理体制改革显著弱化了固定资产投资对流动负债的正向敏感度,证实了地方政府债务治理有助于改善企业投融资期限错配。随后的异质性分析发现,对于地方隐性债务规模大的城市以及融资约束严重、研发密集度强和信息披露质量高的企业,上述效应更为凸显。进一步的作用机制检验表明,地方政府债务管理体制改革显著制约了地方政府隐性债务和债务总规模的持续攀升,而且显著延长了企业债务期限。特别地,地方政府债务管理体制改革提升了企业生产率,并降低了经营风险。本文强调,地方政府债务治理不仅有助于化解地方政府债务风险,而且有利于缓解政企融资竞争关系以优化企业投融资期限匹配,这对于防范化解系统性金融风险和实现经济高质量发展具有重要政策启示。
Using the"fixed assets investment-current liabilities"sensitivity framework,this paper exploits the local government debt management system reform starting from 2015 as a quasi-natural experiment,and investigates the impacts of local government debt governance on corporate investment-financing maturity mismatch behaviors.Our difference-in-differences regressions show that the reform significantly alleviates the positive sensitivity of fixed assets investment to current liabilities.This result confirms the positive role of local government debt governance in alleviating corporate investment-financing maturity mismatch.Further cross-sectional tests indicate that this effect is more pronounced for cities with a larger implicit government debt scale and for firms with greater financial constraints,higher R&D intensity and higher information disclosure quality.Our mechanism tests find that the reform constrains the scale of implicit debt and total debt of local government,and increases corporate debt maturity.In addition,the reform significantly improves firms’productivity and lowers their operating risk.Overall,local government debt governance not only reduces local governments’debt risk,but helps ease the financing competition between governments and firms to optimize the maturity match of corporate investment and financing,providing important policy implications for preventing systemic financial risk and realizing high-quality growth regime.
作者
刘贯春
程飞阳
姚守宇
张军
Liu Guanchun;Cheng Feiyang;Yao Shouyu;Zhang Jun(Lingnan College,Sun Yat-sen University;College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University;.School of Economics,Fudan University)
出处
《管理世界》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第11期71-85,共15页
Journal of Management World
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目“人才资本偏向金融部门的形成逻辑及实体经济增长效应研究”(基金号:72003116)的资助。
关键词
地方政府债务治理
企业投融资期限错配
债务期限结构
governance of local government debt
corporate investment-financing maturity mismatch behaviors
debt maturity structure