地方政府债务治理与企业投融资期限错配改善

Local Government Debt Governance and Corporate Investment-Financing Maturity Mismatch Alleviation

基于“固定资产投资—流动负债”的敏感度框架,本文以2015年逐步推向全国的地方政府债务管理体制改革为一项准自然实验,系统考察了地方政府债务治理对企业投融资期限错配的影响。双重差分估计显示,地方政府债务管理体制改革显著弱化了固定资产投资对流动负债的正向敏感度,证实了地方政府债务治理有助于改善企业投融资期限错配。随后的异质性分析发现,对于地方隐性债务规模大的城市以及融资约束严重、研发密集度强和信息披露质量高的企业,上述效应更为凸显。进一步的作用机制检验表明,地方政府债务管理体制改革显著制约了地方政府隐性债务和债务总规模的持续攀升,而且显著延长了企业债务期限。特别地,地方政府债务管理体制改革提升了企业生产率,并降低了经营风险。本文强调,地方政府债务治理不仅有助于化解地方政府债务风险,而且有利于缓解政企融资竞争关系以优化企业投融资期限匹配,这对于防范化解系统性金融风险和实现经济高质量发展具有重要政策启示。

Using the"fixed assets investment-current liabilities"sensitivity framework,this paper exploits the local government debt management system reform starting from 2015 as a quasi-natural experiment,and investigates the impacts of local government debt governance on corporate investment-financing maturity mismatch behaviors.Our difference-in-differences regressions show that the reform significantly alleviates the positive sensitivity of fixed assets investment to current liabilities.This result confirms the positive role of local government debt governance in alleviating corporate investment-financing maturity mismatch.Further cross-sectional tests indicate that this effect is more pronounced for cities with a larger implicit government debt scale and for firms with greater financial constraints,higher R&D intensity and higher information disclosure quality.Our mechanism tests find that the reform constrains the scale of implicit debt and total debt of local government,and increases corporate debt maturity.In addition,the reform significantly improves firms’productivity and lowers their operating risk.Overall,local government debt governance not only reduces local governments’debt risk,but helps ease the financing competition between governments and firms to optimize the maturity match of corporate investment and financing,providing important policy implications for preventing systemic financial risk and realizing high-quality growth regime.