考虑纵向持股的现代农业供应链运营决策与协调优化研究

Research on Operation Decision and Coordination Optimization of Modern Agricultural Supply Chain Considering Vertical Shareholding

针对农业数字化技术的高成本破解难题及供应链企业间鲁棒性较弱的现象,将纵向持股策略引入到现代农业供应链中,分别构建了公司对数字化技术投资与否、农场对该投资持股与否等不同情景组合下的博弈模型,研究股权合作下现代农业供应链运营决策及协调优化问题。研究发现:投入数字化技术能有效提高农产品品质,实现农场丰产增收,但公司单独对农产品投资该技术使农场产生“搭便车”现象;农场对公司投资数字化技术在一定比例范围内持股,农产品品质得到持续改善,供应链企业决策和绩效实现Pareto改进,同时持股行为使主导者公司获得更多的利润增量,消除了农场“搭便车”现象;结合公司和农场实际运营场景,在股权合作策略下采用交互式Rubinstein讨价还价模型实现了农业供应链的协调和优化。最后,通过数值分析对主要结论进行了充分验证,并探讨了持股比例和品质增量成本系数同时变动对供应链运营决策和绩效的影响。

In recent years, China has introduced a number of measures to vigorously promote the development of digital intelligent agriculture. For example, in 2020, No.1 central document emphasizes the need to strengthen the construction of modern agricultural facilities and carry out the national digital rural pilot project. The digital agriculture development plan(2019-2025 years) also calls for the development of digital agriculture. In addition, some data show that the potential market size of China’s digital agriculture is expected to increase from 13.7 billion dollars in 2015 to 26.8 billion dollars in 2020. Under the dual guidance of national policies and market prospects, many industry giants, such as Alibaba, Jingdong, Country garden, Evergrande group, have laid out the “blue ocean” of agriculture. However, due to the fact that China’s digital agriculture is still in its infancy and the barriers to digital technology are high, the purchase costs and R&D(research and development) investments of relevant technologies and equipment remain high. In 2018, Jingdong Group invested 12.1 billion yuan in technology R&D;to fully realize artificial intelligence pig raising, Alibaba cloud invested hundreds of millions of yuan in targeted training and R&D of ET brain in 2018. The high costs of digitization are bound to reduce the investment enthusiasm of small and medium-sized farms, especially those with insufficient funds, which will affect the long-term development of agricultural digitization. Meanwhile, the contract consciousness of enterprises and farms is relatively weak, and the default rate of order agriculture is high, which also hinders the sustainable development of modern agricultural supply chain.In view of the financing difficulties of farms and distrust with the companies in the same chain, the vertical shareholding strategy is introduced into the agricultural supply chain in which the company is the leader and the farm is the follower. Considering whether the company invests in digital technology and whether the farm holds shares in the investments, the game theory and operational research optimization methods are embraced to develop the mathematical models for different scenarios. The detailed processes are as follows. First of all, a game model is built in which the company does not invest in digital technology in agricultural products, and the model is treated as benchmark model for comparison. Secondly, a game model is constructed in which the company invests in digital technology but the farm does not hold shares in the investments. Then, a game model is developed in which the company invests in digital technology and the farm holds shares in the investments. Furthermore, the optimal decisions and profits of supply chain enterprises in these three cases are obtained, and the corresponding results are compared and analyzed. Finally, the Rubinstein bargaining mechanism is designed, which can reasonably distribute the surplus profits of the supply chain.In order to draw some valuable conclusions, the models are analyzed through numerical analysis, focusing on the relationship between the shareholding strategy and decision-making and profits. The data in the numerical example are given in combination with the actual operation status of the current agricultural supply chains. The results show that, the digital technology can effectively improve the quality of agricultural products and increase the farm’s incomes, but the company’s investments in agricultural products alone make the phenomenon of “free riding” of the farm. Subsequently, when the farm holds a certain proportion of shares in the company’s investments, the quality of agricultural products is continuously improved, and supply chain enterprises’ decision-making and performance are improved. At the same time, the company obtains more profit increment under the equity holding strategy, and the behavior of “free riding” of the farm is eliminated. Furthermore, in combination with the actual operation scenarios of the company and the farm, the interactive Rubinstein bargaining model is adopted under the equity cooperation strategy to achieve the coordination and optimization of the agricultural supply chain.The theoretical value of this paper lies in the innovative introduction of shareholding strategy into the field of digital agricultural supply chain finance, which enriches the research theory of agricultural supply chain. And the practical application value rests with the fact that, the shareholding strategy provides a new investment cooperation mode for the promotion and application of digital technology in the fields.