双渠道供应链中紧俏产品升级成本分担演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Scarce Products’ Development Cost Sharing in a Dual-channel Supply Chain

针对一个制造商和一个零售商所组成的双渠道供应链系统,本文运用演化博弈模型研究了供应链企业在紧俏产品升级成本分担中的产能分配问题,比较了无合作机制以及引入合作机制下供应链系统的演化稳定策略。研究发现:当无合作机制时,供应链系统根据不同的产能分配范围最终会稳定在以下3种策略上:(制造商投资,零售商不投资)、(制造商不投资,零售商投资)以及(制造商不投资,零售商不投资);当引入合作机制时,供应链系统在一定的产能分配范围内最终会稳定在双方共同投资的策略上。本文还通过算例分析了无合作机制时销售新产品的增加值以及产品升级成本对演化稳定策略的影响;产能分配比例,新产品批发价格对单方面投资概率的影响;引入合作机制下分享比例对共同投资为演化稳定策略时的影响。

The sharing of product upgrade costs by companies at the same level or upstream and downstream in the supply chain can reduce the company’s innovation risks and increase the probability of successful product development, especially for scarce products. However, there is often the“free-riding” behavior in product development between companies, which affects their long-term cooperation. Therefore, how to encourage companies to choose joint investment is a problem that supply chain companies need to focus on. The capacity allocation strategy is studied that promotes manufacturers and retailers to choose joint investment in a dual-channel supply chain under the revenue-sharing cooperation mechanism. According to different profit matrices when manufacturers and retailers adopt different investment strategies, an evolutionary game model is established to compare the evolutionary stability strategies of the supply chain system when there is no cooperation mechanism and when the cooperation mechanism is introduced. It is shown that when there is no cooperation mechanism, the supply chain system will either stabilize on the strategy of one party’s investment and one party’s non-investment, or stabilize on the strategy of neither party’s investment;when the cooperation mechanism is introduced, the supply chain system will be stabilized on the strategy of mutual investment by both parties within a certain range of capacity allocation. Finally, the mathematical model is verified numerically through MATLAB, and the data of the calculation example meet the research assumptions. A revenue-sharing cooperation mechanism is proposed from the perspective of evolutionary game to improve the stability of long-term cooperation between enterprises and it helps expand the research on capacity allocation in the field of cost sharing.