农村集体经济中的委托代理关系与机会主义行为研究——基于S省Q村的实地调查

Study on Principal-agent Relationship and Opportunistic Behavior in Rural Collective Economy: Based on Field Investigation in Q Village, S Province

农村集体经济运营过程中存在着复杂的委托代理关系,而代理人村干部的机会主义行为问题严重阻碍了集体经济的发展壮大。现有研究从不同角度解释了村干部机会主义行为何以发生,却较少回应此类行为差异化的逻辑和原因机制。本文基于“委托—代理”的社会嵌入性视角,结合对S省Q村实地调查的现实案例分析后发现:村民与村干部围绕集体资产经营管理活动形成了不同的委托代理关系;由于信息不对称程度和监督成本差异,使得不同代理关系结构的约束有所不同;而委托代理关系的社会嵌入性能以不同方式和程度软化代理结构约束;代理结构约束和社会嵌入性软化之间的耦合,决定了村干部机会主义行为的策略空间及选择位序,使其产生差异化的机会主义行为选择。

There are complex principal-agent relationships in rural collective economy have, and the opportunistic behavior of village cadres have seriously hindered the development of collective economy.Existing studies have explained the occurrence of their behavior, but few respond to the logic and reason mechanism.Based on the perspective of “principal-agent” social embeddedness, combining with the actual case analysis of Q Village, the paper finds that: There are different principal-agent relationships between villagers and village cadres.Different agency relationship structure has different constraints, and can be softening by the social embeddedness.The coupling between them determines the strategic space and selection order of village cadres’ opportunist behavior, which makes them have differentiated opportunistic behavior choices.