摘要
针对目前绿色消费领域中存在的瓶颈问题,利用演化博弈的理论和方法,构建了政府部门、绿色产品生产/服务提供企业(以下简称绿色企业)和消费者三个利益相关主体所组成的演化博弈模型.通过将系统动力学的仿真手段与动态演化思想相结合,对建立的模型进行求解并对均衡点的稳定性进行分析.结果发现,在现行静态奖惩机制下,政府部门、绿色企业和消费者之间不存在稳定的演化均衡策略组合.结合新的管理实践和技术背景,文章提出基于大数据动态监管的绿色企业层级管理制度以及移动互联网环境下消费者绿色消费积分激励制度框架,并通过数值仿真和理论证明对相关方案的可行性进行了验证.即通过上述管理机制,可实现在政府部门尽量少监管的前提下,绿色企业自发执行标准,消费者积极购买绿色产品/服务的稳定均衡状态.
Focusing on the bottlenecks in the green consumption field,we use the theory and method of evolutionary game,build an evolutionary game model which contains the government agency,the green enterprise(short for those enterprises who produce green products and provide green service)and the consumer which are three major stakeholders in the green consumption.Next,we apply system dynamics simulation method to analyze the stability of equilibrium strategy solutions of the game.The simulation results show that no stable equilibrium strategy solution exists in the current interactions among three players.Motivated by the development of mobile consumption and application of new information technologies like real-time location and mobile payment,we propose a dynamic incentive-penalty mechanism framework and verify its effectiveness to achieve the evolution stable state in which with less supervisions from the government agency side,the green enterprises implement the standards strictly and consumers choose to buy eco-labelled products.
作者
靳杰
赵秋红
JIN Jie;ZHAO Qiuhong(School of Economics and Management,Taiyuan University of Technology,Taiyuan 030000;School of Economics and Management,Beihang University,Beijing 100191;Key Laboratory of Compler System Analysis and Administrative Decision,Ministry of Education,Beijing 100191)
出处
《系统科学与数学》
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第10期2740-2755,共16页
Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences
基金
国家自然科学基金创新研究群体项目(72021001)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(21YJCZH055)资助课题。
关键词
绿色消费
演化博弈
动态监管
机制设计
Green consumption
evolutionary game theory
dynamic supervision
mechanism design