基于微分博弈的商业银行与互联网金融平台的合作策略分析

Analysis on Cooperation Tactics Between Commercial Banks and Internet Finance Companies Based on Differential Game

商业银行和互联网金融平台的合作与否会直接影响小微企业融资获得率与融资成本,进而影响小微企业的生存与发展.基于微分博弈理论,从声誉的角度探讨了商业银行与互联网金融平台在分散决策、Stackelberg主从博弈与协同合作决策三种模型下的最优策略,然后比较了三种模型下的均衡结果,并通过数值分析进行验证.研究结论表明,为最大化提升小微企业的声誉,商业银行和互联网金融平台应对小微企业给予适当的激励;小微企业收益与商业银行边际收益和互联网金融平台边际收益呈倒“U”形关系;商业银行与互联网金融平台合作与否取决于小微企业边际收益与贷款方边际收益的相对大小.最后,文章据此提出了促进三者良好互动发展的对策建议.

The cooperation or not between commercial banks and Internet finance platforms directly affect the financing rate and cost of small and micro enterprises(SMEs),which will affect the survival and development of SMEs.Based on the perspective of reputation,differential game theory is used to explore the optimal strategies of commercial banks and Internet finance platforms under the three models of independent decision-making,Stackelberg leader-follower game and coordinated cooperative game,and then compares the equilibrium results under the three models.The results were verified by numerical analysis.The conclusion shows,in order to maximize the reputation of SMEs,commercial banks and Internet finance platforms should give appropriate incentives to SMEs.The income of SMEs is in an inverted"U"shape with the marginal income of commercial banks and the marginal income of Internet financial platforms.Whether commercial banks and Internet finance platforms cooperate or not depends on the relative size of the marginal income of small and micro enterprises and the marginal income of lenders.Based on the conclusions,this paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to promote the benign and interactive development among the three.