母子公司高管纵向联结对子公司治理稳定性的影响研究——来自企业集团框架内上市公司的经验证据

Research on the Influence of Executive’s Vertical Ties between Parent and Subsidiary Companies on the Stability of Governance of Subsidiaries: Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies within the Framework of Enterprise Groups

高管联结现象在管理实践中普遍存在,也引起了学者们的广泛关注。尽管高管横向联结的研究已经日趋丰富,但针对高管纵向联结的研究方兴未艾。本文借助中国上市公司披露的数据,利用门限回归等方法,对母子公司高管联结与子公司治理结构及治理效果稳定性之间的关系进行了研究。结果发现,母子公司高管联结对子公司CEO职位稳定性、股东利益稳定性以及价值成长稳定性具有正向影响。特别地,只有在高管联结程度高于一定门限阈值时,母子公司高管联结的存在才能够提升子公司CEO职位稳定性与股东利益稳定性。进一步研究发现,制度差异显著地调节了高管联结程度的门限效应,即高管联结程度的门限效应在民营公司中更为突出,发挥作用所需的门限阈值更低,作用效果更强。

The phenomenon of Executive’s ties is widespread in management practice, which has also attracted extensive attention of scholars. Although the research on horizontal ties has become increasingly abundant, the research on vertical ties of top managers is still insufficient. Based on the data disclosed by listed companies in China, this paper uses threshold regression to study the relationship between parent-subsidiary company executive’s vertical ties and the stability of governance structure and governance effect of subsidiaries. The results show that, parent-subsidiary executives’ vertical ties has a positive impact on the stability of CEO position, the stability of shareholders’ interests and the stability of the value of firms. Especially, only when the degree of executives’ vertical ties is higher than a certain threshold, the existence of executives’ vertical ties between parent and subsidiary companies can improve the stability of CEO position and the stability of shareholders’ interests. Further research shows that institutional differences significantly moderate the threshold effect of the degree of executives’ vertical ties. The threshold effect of the degree of executives’ vertical ties is more prominent in private firms, the threshold value is lower, and the effect is stronger.