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公平偏好行为下考虑区块链投资的供应链运营决策研究 被引量:3

Operational Decisions of Supply Chains with Blockchain Investment Under Fairness Preference
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摘要 【目的/意义】研究公平偏好行为下考虑区块链投资的供应链运营决策问题,对供应链成员的最优服务努力水平、零售价格以及采购量决策具有指导意义。【设计/方法】考虑由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链,制造商为Stackelberg的领导者,且制造商要进行与区块链技术相关的服务努力投资。利用逆向归纳法得到不同情形下的均衡解,并分析了公平偏好系数对供应链成员利润以及制造商服务努力水平的影响。【结论/发现】首先,零售商的利润随着零售商嫉妒偏好系数的增大而增大,随着制造商同情偏好系数的增大而增大;制造商的利润随着零售商嫉妒偏好系数的增大而减小,随着制造商同情偏好系数的增大而减小。其次,制造商服务努力水平关于制造商同情偏好系数递减,但不受零售商嫉妒偏好系数的影响。也就是说,制造商服务努力水平仅对制造商同情偏好程度敏感。 [Purpose/Significance]This paper studies the operational decisions of supply chains with blockchain investment under fairness preference,which is the guidance for the supply chain members’decisions of service effort level,retail price and order quantity.[Design/Methodology]We consider a two-stage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer,and the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and invests in the service effort about blockchain technology.We use backward induction to obtain the equilibrium solutions under different situations,and study the influences of fairnes preference parameter on the profits of supply chain members and manufacturer’s service effort level.[Conclusions/Findings]It is found that the retailer’s profits increase with the retailer’s envy preference parameter,and also increase with the manufacturer’s sympathy preference parameter.The manufacturer’s profits decrease with the retailer’s envy preference parameter,and also decrease with the manufacturer’s sympathy preference parameter.Then,the manufacturer’s service effort level decreases with the manufacturer’s sympathy preference parameter,but it is not affected by the retailer’s envy preference parameter.That is to say,the manufacturer’s service effort level is only sensitive to the manufacturer’s sympathy preference.
作者 马鹏 邢秀铭 曹杰 孙明典 MA Peng;XING Xiu-ming;CAO Jie;SUN Ming-dian(Nanjing University of Information Science&Technology,Nanjing,210044,China;Xuzhou University of Technology,Xuzhou,221018,China)
出处 《电子科技大学学报(社科版)》 2022年第6期73-81,共9页 Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition)
基金 江苏省社会科学基金项目(21GLB020) 国家级大学生创新创业训练计划支持项目(202110300030) 江苏省大学生创新训练项目(202110300010Z) 南京信息工程大学大学生创新创业训练计划项目(XJDC202110300122).
关键词 公平偏好 区块链 服务努力水平 运营决策 fairness preference blockchain service effort level operational decisions
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