期刊文献+

卡普兰民主理论的困境及超越

The Dilemma and Transcendence of Caplan’s Democratic Theory
下载PDF
导出
摘要 卡普兰在《理性选民的神话》一书中阐述了自己的民主理论,他试图批判传统公共选择学派的“理性的无知”分析框架,构建起“理性的胡闹”分析框架,并提出解决民主失灵的方案。但他对“理性的无知”的否定是失败的,其理论反而是对理性选择固有共识的肯定、对理性选择理论的补充和发展。卡普兰民主理论实质是对西方选举民主的辩护,我们可从中窥见西方民主的本质——以选举为核心的精英政治。要真正解决民主失灵问题,需要摆脱选举环节的局限和精英主义倾向,中国的“全过程人民民主”方能为其提供新的思路。 Caplan elaborated his democratic theory in his book The Myth of the Rational Voter.He tried to criticize the“rational ignorance”analysis framework of the classical public choice school,build the“rational irrationality”analysis framework,and put forward the solution to the failure of democracy.However,his negation of“rational ignorance”is a failure,and his theory is the affirmation of the inherent consensus of rational choice,the supplement and development of the theory of rational choice.The essence of Caplan’s democratic theory is the defense of Western electoral democracy,from which we can see the nature of Western democracy-election-centered meritocracy.To truly address the failure of democracy,we need to get rid of the limitations of the electoral process and tendency towards elitism,and China’s“whole-process people’s democracy”can provide new ideas for it.
作者 程同顺 李庚泰 CHENG Tong-shun;LI Geng-tai(Zhou Enlai School of Management,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China)
出处 《萍乡学院学报》 2022年第4期11-17,共7页 Journal of Pingxiang University
基金 2021年天津市社科规划重点委托项目(TJWT21-07) 2022年度南开大学文科发展基金科学研究类项目重点项目(ZB22BZ0110)。
关键词 卡普兰 理性选择理论 民主失灵 选举民主 Caplan rational choice theory the failure of democracy electoral democracy
  • 相关文献

二级参考文献44

  • 1徐加根.经济学中的理性概念及其演变[J].学术月刊,2005,37(9):35-42. 被引量:6
  • 2吴桂韩.公共选择理论视角下代议制民主的完善机制[J].人大研究,2007(8):26-29. 被引量:3
  • 3[法]古斯塔夫·勒庞,冯克利译.《乌合之众:大众心理研究》.中央编译出版社,2005年版.
  • 4丹尼尔·克莱因主编.《经济学家贡献了什么》,艾佳慧译,法律出版社,2006年.
  • 5James M. Buchanan, Public Choice: The Origins and Development of A Research Program, Fairfax, Virginia, Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, 2003.
  • 6Bryan Caplan, From Friedman to Wittman: The Transformation of Chicago Political Economy, Econ Journal Watch, 2 ( 1 ), 2005.
  • 7Bryan Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter : Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, Princeton University Press, 2007.
  • 8Roger D. Congleton, Informational Limits to Democratic Public Policy: The Jury Theorem, Yardstick Competition, and Ignorance, Public Choice, 132,2007.
  • 9Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York : Harper and Row, 1957.
  • 10Daniel B. Klein, Charlotta Stern, By the Numbers: The Ideological Profile of Professors, AEI Working Paper, 2007.

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部