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废旧快递包装回收最优激励策略研究 被引量:5

Optimal Incentive Strategy of Waste Express Packaging Recycling
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摘要 目的针对快递包装物制造商、快递企业和消费者回收废旧快递包装的积极性不高、回收难等问题,研究多方博弈下的废旧快递包装回收最优激励策略。方法采用博弈论方法,构建闭环供应链模型,分别求出了快递企业的最优回收决策和政府的最优激励策略。结果政府引入激励机制,效果要明显好于不采取激励机制;政府的激励力度对废旧快递包装供应链企业的利润、消费者剩余和社会总福利均有显著的影响,存在使社会总福利最大化的最优激励力度β*值。结论最低回收利用率、消费者最低返还率和政府激励力度这3个指标是政府激励机制的最关键参数,政府应当以使社会总福利最大时的激励力度值β*为最优策略来建立激励机制,这样既能使制造商和快递企业通过回收再利用来增加利润,又能提高消费者参与回收的积极性,增加社会总福利,实现消费者、企业和社会共赢的良性发展目标。 The work aims to study the optimal incentive strategy of waste express packaging recycling under multi-player game aiming at the problems of low enthusiasm and difficulty in recycling of waste express packaging by express packaging manufacturers,express enterprises and consumers.The method of game theory was adopted to construct a closed-loop supply chain model and obtain the optimal recycling decision of express enterprises and the optimal incentive strategy of the government.When the government introduced incentive mechanism,the effect was obviously better than that in the situation without incentive mechanism.The incentive strength of the government had a significant impact on the profits of waste express packaging supply chain enterprises,consumer surplus and total social welfare.There was an optimal incentive strength valueβ*to maximize the total social welfare.The lowest recycling rate,the lowest return rate of consumers and the incentive strength of the government are the most critical parameters of the governmental incentive mechanism.The government should establish the incentive mechanism with the incentive strength valueβ*when the total social welfare is the largest as the optimal strategy,which can not only enable manufacturers and express enterprises to increase profits through recycling,but also improve the enthusiasm of consumers to participate in recycling,thus increasing total social welfare and achieving the benign development goal of win-win for consumers,enterprises and society.
作者 郑克俊 邹小平 ZHENG Ke-jun;ZOU Xiao-ping(School of Business,Guangdong Polytechnic of Science and Technology,Guangdong Zhuhai 519090,China)
出处 《包装工程》 CAS 北大核心 2022年第23期305-314,共10页 Packaging Engineering
基金 广东省教育厅重大科研项目(2017GWZDXM002) 广东省科技创新战略专项资金“攀登计划”项目(pdjh2020a0964) 广东省教育厅科研项目(2019GWTSCX026)。
关键词 快递包装 STACKELBERG博弈 回收再利用 激励机制 政府激励 express packaging Stackelberg game recycling incentive mechanism governmental incentives
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