双无控制与内控重大缺陷研究

Double No Control and Internal Control Major Defects

公司治理是内部控制的顶层设计,既无实际控制人又无控股股东的“双无控制”这一股权变化势必会影响公司内控质量。对此,选取2009-2019年深沪两市A股上市公司为研究样本,检验上市公司双无控制对其内控重大缺陷的影响。研究发现,相对于非双无控制,双无控制公司发生内控重大缺陷的概率较大,其中,第一类代理问题发挥了部分中介作用;异质性检验发现,当公司高管薪酬总额越高、男性高管占比越高、高管平均年龄越小以及公司监事会规模越小、机构投资者持股比例越低时,双无控制对企业内控重大缺陷的影响越大;进一步研究发现,在前十大股东存在关联关系或属于一致行动人的“形式双无控制”企业中,两类代理问题同时并存,并引发内控重大缺陷。研究结论不仅拓展了内控重大缺陷的研究视角,还为上市公司完善内部治理机制以及政府提高上市公司质量提供了经验证据和政策参考。

Corporate governance is the top design of internal control.The change of“double no control”,which has neither actual controller nor controlling shareholder,will inevitably affect the quality of internal control.Therefore,we choose A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Markets from 2009 to 2019 as the research sample to test the influence of double no control on the major defects of internal control of listed companies.It is found that compared with other companies,double no control companies have a higher probability of major internal control defects,in which the first type of agency problem plays a partial intermediary role.The heterogeneity test shows that when the total remuneration of company executives is higher,the proportion of male executives is higher,the average age of executives is smaller,and the scale of company supervisory board is smaller,and the shareholding ratio of institutional investors is lower,the influence of double no control on major internal control defects is greater.Further research shows that in the“double no control”enterprises where the top ten shareholders are related or belong to the concerted action,two kinds of agency problems coexist,and lead to serious defects of internal control.The conclusion not only expands the perspective of internal control,but also provides empirical evidence and policy reference for perfecting internal governance mechanism and improving the quality of listed companies.