权力结构对交叉持股供应链减排的影响

The Impact of Power Structure on Emission Reduction ofCross Shareholding Supply Chain

通过分析权力结构对交叉持股供应链减排与定价的影响,构建集中决策、制造商为领导者、零售商为领导者以及制造商和零售商地位相同四种情况下的供应链减排博弈模型,研究不同权力结构下交叉持股供应链减排与定价决策,并使用算例分析的方法讨论政府补贴和交叉持股比例对四种权力结构下供应链决策的影响。研究发现,制造商和零售商地位相同时产品的减排水平最高,零售商为领导者时产品的减排水平最低;制造商和零售商地位相同时产品的零售价格与零售商为领导者时产品的零售价格相等,同时这两种情况下产品的零售价格最高;产品减排水平随着政府补贴的增加而上升,政府补贴能够有效提高产品减排水平,但是政府补贴并没有降低产品价格,反而使产品价格越来越高。

Under the government subsidy policy,this paper analyzes the impact of supply chain power structure on the emission reduction and pricing of cross shareholding supply chain,constructs the supply chain emission reduction game model under the four conditions of centralized decision-making,manufacturer as leader,retailer as leader and the same status of manufacturer and retailer,and analyzes the emission reduction and pricing decision-making of cross shareholding supply chain under different power structures.The influence of government subsidies and cross shareholding ratio on supply chain decision-making under four power structures is analyzed by using the method of example analysis.It is found that when manufacturers and retailers are in the same position,the low-carbon degree of products is the highest,and when retailers are leaders,the low-carbon degree of products is the lowest.When the manufacturer and retailer are in the same position,the retail price of the product is equal to that when the retailer is the leader.At the same time,the retail price of the product is the highest in the above two cases and the product price is the lowest in centralized decision-making.The low-carbon degree of products increases with the increase of government subsidies.Government subsidies can effectively improve the low-carbon degree of products,reduce carbon emissions and achieve emission reduction targets.However,government subsidies do not reduce the product price,but make the product price higher and higher.