“准财政政策”能促进企业创新吗?——基于社保基金委托投资的预期引导和资源配置效应

Can Quasi-fiscal Policy Promote Enterprise Innovation?Based on Expected Guidance and Resource Allocation Effect of Social Security Fund Entrusted Investment

社保基金投资是政府出资人通过股票市场影响企业经营发展的一种制度安排,其中委托投资管理人“操盘”成为主要市场化投资运营模式。文章将社保基金委托投资作为代表中国制度优势的“准财政政策”工具,对其促进企业创新的政策效应进行研究。研究发现:社保基金委托投资可以促进企业创新,尤其是在政策支持企业、非国有企业、制造业企业以及高投资机会企业中,这一促进效应更加显著。进一步考察作用机制发现:社保基金委托投资可以通过政策利好的预期引导和政策驱动的资源注入两种渠道产生“准财政政策”效应。研究揭示了社保基金委托投资促进企业创新的政策效应及其传导机制,提出了“准财政政策”工具如何提质增效的政策建议。

Social security fund investment is an institutional arrangement in which government investors influence the operation and development of enterprises through the stock market, and entrusting investment managers to operate has become the main market-oriented investment operation mode. This article takes the entrusted investment of social security funds as a quasi-fiscal policy tool representing China’s institutional advantages, and studies its policy effect on promoting enterprise innovation. The study finds that entrusted investment can promote enterprise innovation, especially in policy-supported enterprises, non-state-owned enterprises, manufacturing enterprises and enterprises with high investment opportunities. Further investigation of the mechanism of action finds that entrusted investment can produce a quasi-fiscal policy effect through two channels: favorable policy guidance and policy-driven resource injection. This study reveals the policy effect and specific transmission mechanism of the social security fund’s entrusted investment to promote enterprise innovation, and puts forward policy suggestions on how to improve the quality and efficiency of quasi-fiscal policy tools.