摘要
跨流域调水工程生态补偿是解决工程水源区和受水区之间水资源生态环境保护与经济协调发展的有效途径。基于演化博弈理论,构建跨流域调水工程生态补偿演化博弈模型,对水源区和受水区地方政府及上级政府三者之间的利益诉求与补偿行为进行分析,并结合具有复杂博弈关系的南水北调东线工程生态补偿实证进行研究。研究表明:在无上级政府监管下的跨流域调水工程水源区和受水区难以实现最优稳定均衡策略(水源区保护,受水区补偿),只有引入上级政府监管,建立约束激励机制才能实现最优稳定均衡策略,达到社会效益最优;此外,引入加权移动平均法测得南水北调东线工程水源区2014-2019年的排污权,明晰了水源区污染排放的变化情况,基于排污权交易法确定水源区整体2014-2019年的生态补偿标准分别为0.26、1.13、3.98、5.07、4.21、3.28亿元,补偿标准随着调水量的变化而变化;在此基础上确定了2014-2019年南水北调东线工程实现最优稳定均衡策略时生态补偿的约束激励范围,明确了上级政府给予水源区或受水区单方不履行义务博弈方的处罚越大,越容易实现最优稳定均衡策略,约束激励资金不低于水源区生态环保投入的两倍和受水区生态补偿费用是实现最优稳定均衡策略的必要条件,为南水北调东线工程生态补偿机制的构建提供决策依据和思路方法。
The ecological compensation of inter-basin water transfer project is an effective way to solve the coordinated development of water resources ecological environment protection and economic development between the project water source area and the water receiving area.Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of ecological compensation for inter-basin water transfer projects,and analyzes the interest demands and compensation behaviors among the local governments in the water source area,the water receiving area,and the higher-level governments.An empirical research is done on the ecological compensation of the eastern route of South-to-North Water Transfer Project.The research shows that it is difficult to achieve the optimal stable equilibrium strategy(water source area protection,water receiving area compensation)in the water source area and water receiving area of the inter-basin water transfer project without the supervision of the higher government.The optimal stable equilibrium strategy is realized and the best social benefits are achieved.In addition,the weighted moving average method is introduced to measure the emission rights of the water source area of the eastern route of South-to-North Water Transfer Project from 2014 to 2019,which clarifies the changes of pollution discharge in the water source area.Based on the emission trading method,the ecological compensation standards of the whole water source area from 2014 to 2019 were determined to be 26,113,398,507,421,and 328 million yuan respectively,and the compensation standards changed with the change of water transfer;The scope of ecological compensation constraints and incentives for the East Route Project to achieve the optimal stable equilibrium strategy,clarifies that the higher the government imposes on the water source area or the water receiving area unilaterally fails to fulfill the obligation,the greater the penalty,the easier it is to achieve the optimal stable equilibrium strategy and restrict the incentive funds not less than twice the ecological and environmental protection investment in the water source area and the ecological compensation fee in the water receiving area are necessary conditions to achieve the optimal stable and balanced strategy,and provide a decision-making basis and thinking methods for the construction of the ecological compensation mechanism for the eastern route of South-to-North Water Transfer Project.
作者
李继清
薛智明
汪定盼
LI Ji-qing;XUE Zhi-ming;WANG Ding-pan(School of Water Resources and Hydropower Engineering,North China Electric Power University,Beijing 102206,China;Suzhou Institute of North China Electric Power University,Suzhou 215123,Jiangsu Province,China;Qingyang Water Bureau,Qingyang 745000,Gansu Province,China)
出处
《中国农村水利水电》
北大核心
2022年第12期31-38,46,共9页
China Rural Water and Hydropower
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(52179014)。
关键词
生态补偿
演化博弈
南水北调东线工程
排污权交易法
ecological compensation
evolutionary game theory
eastern route of South-to-North Water Transfer Project
emission trading method