撤县设市、行政扩权与工业用地价格

County-to-city Upgrading,Empowerment and Industrial Land Prices

本文使用2013—2019年中国土地网的交易数据,以撤县设市为外生冲击,分析了行政扩权对工业用地使用的影响。研究发现,撤县设市提升了以低于国家规定最低标准价格出让的工业用地的比重,并且导致工业用地价格降低了约9.60%。实证结果不支持土地供应增加导致地价下降的假说。进一步分析发现,撤县设市增加了以非“招拍挂”方式出让的工业用地比重,削弱了市场配置土地资源的能力。本文分析表明,新型城镇化背景下,县级政府在撤县设市后获得了更大的自主权,通过干预工业土地转让降低了工业用地价格。

Using transaction data on chinalands􀆰com from 2013 to 2019,this paper analyzes the impact of administrative empowerment on industrial land prices by taking county-to-city upgrading(che xian she shi)as exogenous shocks.We found that the county-to-city upgrading leads to an increase in the proportion of industrial land transferred to enterprises at a price lower than the minimum standard stipulated by the state.The empirical results showed that the industrial land prices decreased by about 9􀆰60%.The results do not support the hypothesis that increases in land supply lead to decreases in land prices.Further analysis showed that after county-to-city upgrading,a larger proportion of industrial land was transacted in a nonmarket way,which weakened the capability of market allocation of land resources.This paper shows that under the context of new urbanization,countylevel governments obtained more power through county-to-city upgrading and had stronger motivation to intervene industrial land markets,resulting in decreases in industrial land prices.