中央审计与污染治理——基于城镇污水垃圾处理专项资金审计的视角

Central Audit and Pollution Control:From the Perspective of Audit of Special Funds for Urban Sewage and Garbage Treatment

本文以中国9个省市2010年度城镇污水垃圾处理专项资金审计这一事件冲击为准自然实验,利用2006—2015年311个地级市面板数据,探讨了中央审计与污染治理的因果关系。研究结果显示,中央审计对提高污水处理率具有显著的正面影响,而对提高生活垃圾处理率并未产生显著影响,这说明中央审计在缓解环境公共品可视性偏差方面发挥的重要作用。然而,中央审计并未产生持续的污水防治效应,对城镇污水治理的影响呈现倒U形关系,拐点出现在中央审计后第三年。更为重要的是,中央审计对专项资金使用效率的审查,提高了污水处理等相关设施的效能,从而至少可以在短期内改善污水治理,尤其是审计力度和污水处理支出相对较大的地区。此外,我们还发现中央审计对企业的非法排污行为具有一定的震慑效应,但仅限于审计当年。

Based on the impact of the audit of special funds for urban sewage and garbage treatment in 2010 in nine provincial regions of China,we explore the causal relationship between central audit and pollution control by using the data of 311 prefecture-level cities in China from 2006 to 2015.The results show that the central audit has a significant positive impact on improving the sewage treatment rate,but has no significant impact on the domestic garbage treatment rate,which reflects the central audit plays an important role in alleviating the deviation of visibility on public environmental goods.At the same time,the central audit does not produce continuous sewage improvement effect,and the impact on urban sewage treatment shows an inverted Ushaped relationship,and the inflection point appears in the third year after the central audit.More importantly,the central audit,through the review on the usage of special funds,has improved the treatment efficiency of sewage and other related facilities,so that at least in the short term,sewage treatment can be improved,especially in areas where audit intensity and sewage treatment expenditure are relatively large.We also find that central audit has a certain deterrent effect on the illegal discharge of enterprises,but only in the audit year.