数据要素化背景下的数字新基建招标机制设计——最优机制的视角

Digital Infrastructure Procurement Mechanism Design under Data Factorization——The Perspective of Optimal Mechanism

本研究假设在数字新基建项目建成后,政府可以通过分享数字新基建产生的数据以提升项目回报。基于机制设计理论,本文探讨这一存在机制设计者事后投入的招标问题。本文证明,当企业仅存在逆向选择时,政府可以采用“事后分成+固定支付”的线性支付方式,实现对竞标企业的完全抽租和社会最优配置。本文还探讨了当企业同时存在逆向选择和道德风险时,政府的最优招标机制。本文能为数字新基建招标与数据要素市场化改革提供思路。

We assume that by sharing data,the government can improve the return of a digital new infrastructure construction project.By applying the theory of mechanism design in this procurement problem with designer’s ex-post investment,we prove that by using a fixed-plus-share payment procurement mechanism,the government can extract all rent of bidding firms and achieve the social optimal when firms have adverse-selection problem.In addition,we discuss the optimal procurement mechanism when both adverse-selection and moral-hazard problems arise.Our research will contribute to resolving problems in the digital new infrastructure construction,and will also contribute to the marketization of digital factor.