独立董事薪酬激励对企业融资约束的影响研究

A Study on the Impact of Independent Directors’ Remuneration Incentives on Corporate Financing Constraints

文章选取沪深两市2011—2020年A股上市公司的数据作为分析样本,研究了独立董事薪酬激励对企业融资约束的影响。研究发现:随着独立董事薪酬激励的增加,企业融资约束先降后升,呈现非线性的U型关系。表明适度的独立董事薪酬激励水平有助于缓解企业融资约束,而过高的独立董事薪酬激励水平将会增加企业融资难度,并且两者的非线性关系在内部控制质量较差的企业以及民营企业中更加显著。进一步分析发现:信息披露质量在独立董事薪酬激励与企业融资约束的关系中发挥部分中介作用。

The article takes the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen markets during 2011-2020 as the sample for analysis, and investigates the impact of independent directors’ remuneration incentives on corporate financing constraints. It is found that with the increase of independent directors’ remuneration incentives, corporate financing constraints first fall and then rise, showing a non-linear U-shaped relationship. It shows that a moderate level of independent directors’ remuneration incentive helps to alleviate the financing constraints, while an excessive level of remuneration incentive will aggravate the difficulty of corporate financing,and the non-linear relationship is more significant in the enterprises with poor internal control quality and private enterprises. Further analysis finds that the quality of information disclosure plays a partially mediating role in the relationship between independent directors’ remuneration incentives and corporate financing constraints.