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“一带一路”沿线能源业气象巨灾共保体演化博弈分析

Game Analysis of the Evolution of Meteorological Catastrophe Coinsurance in the Energy Industry along the"Belt and Road"
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摘要 “一带一路”沿线为气象灾害多发区,气象巨灾严重影响了我国海外能源投资,研究相关共保体参与主体的行为有重要意义。该文采用演化博弈的方法对参与构建共保体主体行为进行研究,构建了复制动态方程,并对过程进行了数值仿真。结果表明,我国作为“一带一路”海外能源投资的主要输出国,必须在共保体的构建中处于主导地位,在构建前期联合外国政府对保险机构提供资金支持,后期注重引导共保体协同运营。对于外国政府和相关保险机构来说,只要合作利益足够,他们都会参与到共保体的构建中。最后为气象巨灾共保体的长期稳健经营提供了若干建议。 The meteorological disasters along the“Belt and Road”are common areas.The meteorological catastrophe has seriously affected China’s overseas energy investment.It is of great significance to study the behavior of related coinsurance participating subjects.In this paper,evolutionary game method is used to study the behavior of co-insurers,the replication dynamic equation is constructed,and the process is simulated numerically.The results show that,as the main exporting country of overseas energy investment in"Belt and Road",China must be in a leading position in the construction of coinsurance.In the early stage of construction,China should cooperate with foreign governments to provide financial support to insurance institutions,and pay attention to guiding coinsurance cooperative operation in the later stage.For foreign governments and relevant insurance institutions,as long as the cooperation benefits are sufficient,they will participate in the construction of coinsurance.Finally,some suggestions for long-term stable operation of meteorological catastrophe coinsurance are provided.
作者 段一群 夏紫龙 Yiqun Duan;Zilong Xia(School of Management Engineering,Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology,Nanjing,Jiangsu,210044,China)
出处 《管理科学与研究(中英文版)》 2022年第5期29-32,共4页 Management Science and Research
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究项目“‘一带一路’沿线国家气象巨灾指数保险共同体的合作机制研究”(编号19YJAGJW004)。
关键词 “一带一路” 气象巨灾 共保体 演化博弈 “Belt and Road” Meteorological Catastrophe Coinsurance Evolutionary Game
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