基于委托代理模型的线上广告时序策略与线下服务激励机制研究

Research on Online Advertising Timing Strategy and Offline Service Incentive Mechanism Based on Principal-Agent Model

针对线上零售商入驻线下体验店的委托代理行为,构建考虑线上广告与契约设计的博弈模型,探究二者不同时序决策对供应链绩效、线下服务的影响。研究发现:(1)线上零售商的预先广告水平与信息对称情形下相同,并对固定支付产生“替代效应”,预先契约模式的广告决策可根据契约参数灵活调整,从而形成“差异效应”;(2)线上零售商在预先广告模式下的期望利润比预先契约模式下更优,即前者的“替代效应”强于后者的“差异效应”;(3)供应链绩效与线下体验店服务效率有关,当线下体验店的服务效率较低时,预先契约模式可以使供应链总利润更优。

A game model considering online advertising and contract design is constructed to investigate the impact of different timing decisions on supply chain performance and offline services for the principal-agent behaviors of online retailers in offline experience stores.The study finds that:firstly,the level of upfront advertising by the online retailer is the same as that in the case of information symmetry,and there is a “substitution effect” on fixed payments.The advertising decision of the upfront contract model can be flexibly adjusted according to the contract parameters,thus creating a “differential effect”;secondly,the online retailer’s expected profits are better in the upfront advertising model than that in the upfront contract model,i.e.,the “substitution effect” of the former is stronger than the “differential effect” of the latter;thirdly,the supply chain performance is related to the service efficiency of offline experience stores,and when the service efficiency is low,the upfront contract model can make the total profit of the supply chain better.