企业需求驱动下技术成果持续研发的合作博弈与投资决策

Cooperative Game and Investment Decision on Continuous R&D of Technological Achievements Driven by Firm’s Technological Demands

基于企业与外部科研团队合作将专利等形式的技术成果定向研发的现实情境,构建双方共同持有技术成果持续研发实物期权的“先讨价还价,后选择投资时机”的两阶段决策模型,推导给出企业与科研团队合作共赢的最优投资时机和最优合作契约,论证双方为技术成果持续研发承诺付出的努力对最优决策参数的影响。研究发现:科研团队和企业在谈判时的努力承诺越高,企业进行投资决策的最优投资阈值越高;当企业面对技术成熟度和技术相关性区分的不同类型科研团队时,可以通过决定在契约中是否包含现金转移条款,以及提供非资金形式的创新支持服务,来影响科研团队的努力承诺和合作意愿,确保合作顺利开展,最终满足企业的技术需求。

In this study,a two-stage decision model in which the firm and the SRT exercise a jointly held real option of investing continuous R&D activities of a technological achievement is provided.The sequence move is the firm and the SRT committing to terms first and then the firm choosing the timing.Then the optimal entry timing and cooperation contract in which both parties can achieve win-win cooperation are derived,and the influence of effort commitments of the SRT and the firm on the optimal parameters are demonstrated.The results show that the higher the effort commitments of SRT and the firm in negotiation,the higher the firm’s optimal investment threshold in the investment decision.When facing different types(differentiated by maturity and relevance of technology) of SRTs,the firm can decide whether to include cash transfer clauses and provide what degree of non-financial innovation support services in the contract to affect the willingness and commitment of SRTs to cooperate,to ensure the cooperation works well and meet the technological needs.