多主体视角下的科技监督系统演化博弈机制研究

Research on the Evolutionary Game Mechanism of Science and Technology Supervision System from the Perspective of Multisubject

探讨我国科技创新治理体系中科技监督的运行模式和内在机制,基于演化博弈理论构建政府、项目管理者、项目执行者多主体的演化博弈模型。在分析各博弈主体策略选择稳定性的基础上,利用计算机仿真,探索各博弈主体的动态演化过程及不确定性因素对演化策略的影响。研究结果表明:在当前科技治理体系下,政府监督作用无法替代,政府“积极监督”策略将保障科技项目顺利进行,获得最优治理结果;项目管理者总是倾向于“积极监督”,是项目管理者的最优策略;项目执行者随着政府监督策略作出调整,受管理者策略影响较小;在政府“监督缺位”的条件下,项目执行者的最优策略为“不自律”,将导致严重科研不端等风险事件发生率大大提高。

This paper focus on the mechanism of China's science and technology supervision system,and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government,project manager and project executor based on evolutionary game theory.Based on the analysis of the stability of strategy selection of each game subject,numerical simulation is used to explore the dynamic evolution process of each game subject and the influence of uncertain factors on the evolution strategy.The results show that under the current S&T governance system,government’s supervision should be priority which play a pivotal role.Government’s initiative supervision will ensure the progress of S&T projects and obtain the optimal governance results.Managers always tend to initiative supervision,which is the best strategy.Executor’s strategy always adjusts with the strategy of government’s strategy,and was not directly related with manager’s strategy.Finally,under the condition of absence of supervision,the optimal strategy of the project executor is non self-discipline,which might result in negative events such as misconduct or even illegal events in scientific research.