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政府补贴在新基建进程中的作用——一个演化博弈的视角 被引量:1

Role of Government Subsidies in the Process of New Infrastructure Construction——An Evolutionary Game Perspective
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摘要 本文构建政企双方的演化博弈模型,研究政企双方的行为互动机制,分析模型中双方的演化稳定策略,并数值模拟政府补贴意愿、政府补贴额度、政府检查概率、企业进入新基建行业意愿等因素变化时,政企行为的演化路径。研究结果表明:政企双方的行为相互影响;新基建行业的高额收益是吸引企业进入的重要因素,但是高昂的研发成本也是企业进入新基建行业的主要阻碍;政府的补贴额度存在一个最优的区间;政府检查概率提升对政府选择补贴策略与企业选择进入新基建行业均具有正向影响。政府应在给予企业适度的补贴资金扶持新基建发展的同时,成立专业的检查监督小组,及时了解企业的投资运营动态,提高补贴的有效性和精准度,以促进新基建良性、有序发展。研究结论为更好发挥“有为政府”在我国新基建发展进程的作用提供了借鉴。 Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper studies interacted behavior mechanism between the government and the enterprises.Besides, this paper analyzes the evolutionary stable strategies of both sides in the model.Numerical simulation method is employed to analyze the evolution path of government and enterprise behaviors when factors such as the government wil-lingness to subsidize, the amount of government subsidy, the probability of government inspection, and the willingness of enterprises to enter the new infrastructure industry change.The results show that: the behaviors of both government and enterprise influence each other;the high income of the new infrastructure industry is an important factor to attract enterprises to enter, but the high R&D cost is also the main obstacle for enterprises to enter the new infrastructure industry;there is an optimal range of government subsidies;a growing probability of inspection improves the probability of the government to subsidize and encourage enterprises to enter the new infrastructure industry..The government should subsidizes enterprises appropriately to support the development of new infrastructure, meanwhile, the government should also set up a special team to inspect and supervise the investment and operation process of enterprises, which can improve the effectiveness of subsidies.So as to promote sound and orderly development of new infrastructure The research conclusion provides a reference for the“promising government”to play its role in the process of new infrastructure construction in China.
作者 任俊帆 Ren Junfan(School of Economics,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China)
出处 《工业技术经济》 北大核心 2023年第1期139-148,共10页 Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
关键词 政府补贴 新基建 演化博弈 有为政府 政企行为 政府监督 government subsidies new infrastructure evolutionary game promising government government and enterprise behavior government supervision
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