繁忙董事会对银行绩效与风险承担影响的实证分析

The impact of busy board of directors on bank performance and risk

基于委托代理理论和资源依赖理论,以我国16家上市银行2009年至2020年的数据为样本,构建了“繁忙董事会-董事会职能-银行绩效与风险承担”的分析思路,分析了繁忙董事会对银行绩效与风险承担的影响。研究发现:繁忙董事会显著降低了银行绩效;繁忙董事会显著加剧了银行整体风险;执行董事外部多席位对银行绩效与整体风险有显著的负面影响。因此,应合理控制董事外部兼职数量,尤其应减少执行董事外部兼职数量,减少董事长和行长的外部兼职数量;积极完善独立董事制度,改善独立董事任职环境,充分发挥独立董事在银行治理中的作用。

This article examines the impact of busy board of directors on bank performance and risk in light of the principal agent theory and resource dependence theory.A model of"busy board of directors—functions of board of directors—bank performance and risk"is estimated based on data from 16 listed domestic banks between 2009 and 2020.The results reveal that busy outside directors may significantly undermine the bank′s performance and increase its overall risk.Therefore,it is suggested that the external serving of managing directors,board chairman,bank president and other board directors should be limited and the independent director system should be completed so as to enable independent directors to take on more responsibility in bank governance.