摘要
开展全民所有自然资源资产所有权委托代理机制试点工作,对于推进产权制度改革、促进自然资源资产的高效配置和保值增值具有重大意义。为了落实全民所有自然资源资产所有者职责,需建立激励机制,使代理人拥有更多资源配置自主权,实现自然资源资产经营管理创新。考虑到全民所有自然资源资产的公共性和公益性,在全民所有自然资源资产所有权多重委托代理模型中引入公平互惠偏好,使用友善函数分析委托人和代理人之间的互惠关系,探讨影响委托代理契约激励效果的因素。为了完善全民所有自然资源资产所有权委托代理激励机制,要合理确定产出分享比例,使代理人的努力履责程度高于最大努力水平的1/2,委托人分配给代理人的固定收益应超过最高固定收益的1/2;编制各级代理人的自然资源清单时要考虑权利与责任的匹配,以纵向政府间行政协议的形式明确各委托代理主体的权利和义务;降低地方政府的履责风险。
It is of great significance to make experiments on the principal-agent mechanism of the ownership of state-owned natural resources assets for the reform of the property rights system and the efficient allocation,the maintenance and appreciation of natural resource assets. In order to implement the responsibility of the owner of state-owned natural resource assets,it is necessary to establish an incentive mechanism to enable agents to have more autonomy in resource allocation and realize the innovation of natural resource asset management. Based on the research results of other scholars,the paper constructs a multi principal-agent model for the ownership of state-owned natural resource assets. Considering the publicity and commonweal of state-owned natural resource assets,the preference for fairness and reciprocity is introduced into the multi principal-agent model,and the friendly function is adopted to analyze the reciprocal relationship between the principal and the agent. The factors that affect the incentive effect of the principal-agent contract are also discussed. In order to improve the principal-agent incentive mechanism for the ownership of state-owned natural resources assets,it is necessary to reasonably determine the proportion of output sharing,so that the degree of the agent’s effort to perform its duties is higher than half of the maximum effort level,and the fixed income distributed by the principal to the agent should exceed half of the maximum fixed income. When preparing the list of natural resources of agents at all levels,the matching of rights and responsibilities should be considered,and the rights and obligations of each principal and agent should be clarified in the form of a vertical intergovernmental administrative agreement. It is also necessary to reduce the responsibility risk of local governments.
作者
于振英
Yu Zhenying(Hebei GEO University,Shijiazhuang 050031,China)
出处
《当代经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第1期1-11,共11页
Contemporary Economic Management
基金
河北省研究生示范课程建设项目《中级微观经济学》(KCJSX2021094)。
关键词
全民所有
自然资源资产所有权
委托代理机制
公平互惠
激励效果
state-owned
ownership of natural resources assets
the principal-agent mechanism
fairness and reciprocity
incentive effect