期刊文献+

交通部门监管与交通参与人违法占用应急车道行为演化博弈分析

Game Analysis of Traffic Department Supervision and Evolution of Traffic Participants’Illegal Occupation of Emergency Lane
下载PDF
导出
摘要 社会车辆违法占用应急车道会扰乱正常的交通秩序,影响应急车道在紧急情况发生时的疏导、应急作用。针对城市环线、快速路及高速路两侧的社会车辆违法占用应急车道问题,结合考虑第三方群众的监督举报作用、电子监控的抓拍作用,构建交通参与人与交通部门之间的演化博弈模型。建立复制动态方程,通过演化稳定策略分析及仿真分析,得到不同情形下交通部门和交通参与人的演化稳定策略。研究表明:交通部门与交通参与人的决策依据均趋向于收益最大化原则或成本最低原则;第三方举报率越大、电子监控抓拍率越大、收益损失比越小,交通部门越趋向于被动监管;被查处时交通参与人受到的惩罚力度越大、配合调查成本越高,交通部门主动监管成功率越高;交通部门在保证较高监管成功率前提下,更倾向于选择被动监管策略。结合以上结论,提出交通部门采用新技术降本增效、倡导公众积极检举、强化监管、处罚力度,可以促使双方博弈策略朝着有利于交通部门监管的方向发展。 Aiming at illegal occupation of emergency lane by social vehicles on roadsides of city loop,expressway and highway,the evolutionary game model between traffic participants and traffic department is constructed by considering the supervision and reporting by third-party public and the use of electronic monitoring.By establishing the replication dynamic equation,the stable evolution strategies of traffic department and traffic participants are obtained through evolution stability strategy analysis and simulation analysis.The research shows that the decision-making of both traffic department and traffic participants tends to observe the principle of maximization of revenue or the principle of lowest cost.The higher the third-party reporting rate and electronic monitoring capture rate,the smaller the income loss ratio,and the more likely the traffic department is to adopt passive supervision.The greater the punishment and the higher the cost of cooperation with investigation,the higher the success rate of active supervision by the traffic department.Under the premise of ensuring a high success rate of regulation,the traffic department tends to choose passive supervision strategy.Therefore,it is suggested that traffic department can adopt new technology to reduce cost and increase efficiency,call on the public to actively report illegal occupations and strengthen supervision and punishment to prompt two sides to take game strategy that develop in the direction conductive to the supervision of traffic department.
作者 牟玲玲 涂家婷 付一帆 MU Ling-ling;TU Jia-ting;FU Yi-fan(School of Economics and Management,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401,China;College of Public Administration,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan Hubei 430074,China;College of Management and Economy,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China)
出处 《北京交通大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2022年第4期76-86,共11页 Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition)
基金 国家自然科学基金项目“住房租赁市场核心主体决策行为博弈及协调机制研究”(71904042)。
关键词 交通工程 应急车道 演化博弈 交通部门 交通参与人 traffic engineering emergency lane evolutionary game traffic department traffic participants
  • 相关文献

参考文献16

二级参考文献123

共引文献145

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部