小微企业员工社会保险参保率低的经济学理论解释及优化路径

On the Economic Theory Explanation and Optimization Approach to Low Social Insurance Participation Rate of Employees in Small and Micro Enterprises

在我国社会保险法制化建设的背景下,小微企业员工社会保险参保率低现象,成为社会保障领域关注的热点问题。本研究以经济学为新视角,分别从利润挤出、博弈理论下的拉弗曲线以及劳动力需求—供给模型(D-S模型)等方面,深入探析该现象背后的经济致因,提出增强劳资双方参保意识、确定合理参保费额、加强社保缴费监督力度、加大社保补贴和激励力度等优化路径,从而推动小微企业主动参与社保,提高小微企业员工社会保险的参保率。

Under the background of our social insurance legal system construction,the low participation rate of social insurance in small and micro enterprises has become a hot issue with attention paid to in the field of social security.Based on the phenomenon,this study takes Economics as a new perspective and analyzes the economic causes behind this phenomenon from three aspects,namely profit crowding out,Laffer curve under game theory and labor demand-supply model(D-S model).Finally,combined with the analysis of the domestic reality and the economic causes to the problem,this paper comes up with a feasible optimization path to strengthen the social insurance publicity and education,improve the labor and capital participation consciousness and the rationality of fee and payment supervision,thus,to increase social security subsidies and incentives and motivate small and micro enterprises to take the initiative to raise the social insurance coverage rate of the small and micro enterprise staff.