基于主从博弈的主动配电网阻塞管理

The Congestion Management in Active Distribution Network Based on the Master-Slave Game

随着需求侧灵活性资源在配电网中的渗透率不断提高,其不协调的运行方式可能会导致配电网中线路阻塞和节点电压越限。为解决这些问题,提出了一种配电网节点边际电价统一出清的主从博弈双层调度框架。上层框架解决用户在负荷聚合商引导下的用电成本最小化问题,负荷聚合商为主从博弈的领导者;下层框架解决配电网系统运营商在考虑网络潮流安全和电压越限前提下的社会福利最大化问题,配电网系统运营商为主从博弈的追随者。利用Karush-Kuhn-Tucker最优性条件和对偶定理,将非线性双层问题转化为单层混合整数线性规划问题求解。仿真算例验证分析了所提出的模型对缓解网络阻塞的有效性,以及灵活性资源在配电网阻塞管理当中的作用。

With continually increase of permeability of demand-side flexible resources in distribution network, its uncoordinated operating mode may lead to line congestion and nodal voltage out-of-limit in distribution network. To cope with these problems, a master-slave game bi-level dispatching framework, in which the nodal marginal price of distribution network was uniformly cleared, was proposed. The problem of minimizing user’ s electricity utilization cost under the guidance of the load aggregator, which was the leader of the masterslave game, was solved by the upper framework. The problem of maximizing social welfare by the distribution network system operator, which was the follower of the master-slave game,under the premise of considering power flow security and voltage out-of-limit was solved by the lower framework. By use of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality condition and the duality theorem, the nonlinear bi-layer problem was translated into monolayer mixed integer linear programming problem to solve.The correctness of the proposed model is verified by simulation result, and its effectiveness of mitigating distribution network congestion as well as the effect of flexible resources in the management of distribution network congestion are analyzed.