蒯因整体论的两个层面

Two aspects of Quine’s holism

基于对经验论的系统批判,蒯因提出其整体论思想,它既是一种知识论层面的确证整体论,又是一种哲学语义分析层面的意义整体论。确证整体论和意义整体论的论证相互关联,从确证整体论到意义整体论的论证遇到许多困难,而从蒯因拒斥分析—综合之分的角度看,比之确证整体论,其意义整体论更具有逻辑的基础性。深入研究蒯因整体论思想的内在结构和理论张力,可以为当代整体论论争和整体主义知识论建构的研究带来新的启示。

Based on the systematic critique of empiricism, Quine proposed his holism, which is both confirmation holism at the level of epistemology and meaning holism at the level of philosophical semantic analysis. The arguments of confirmation holism and meaning holism are interrelated. The argument from confirmation holism to meaning holism encounters many difficulties. From the perspective of Quine′s rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction, the meaning holism is more logically basic than the confirmation holism. An in-depth study of the internal structure and theoretical tension of Quine′s holism can bring new enlightenment to the research on contemporary debates on holism and the construction of holism theory of knowledge.