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纵向约束与相关市场界定——来自汽车行业的证据

Vertical Restraint and Relevant Market Definition——Evidence from the Automobile Industry
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摘要 本文构建了离散选择的需求模型和纵向寡头竞争模型,并基于2005—2016年上海市汽车市场交易数据,按照反垄断相关市场界定的SSNIP测试方法,从理论和实证上考察了纵向市场结构对于相关市场界定的影响。研究发现相对于线性双边际情形,在纵向约束情形下采用SSNIP测试会倾向于界定出更宽的相关市场。借助纵向寡头竞争模型的实证框架来处理批发价格无法观测的实际难题,本文还尝试以车型和产地为范围刻画相关市场。参照欧盟的整体豁免规制政策,部分汽车制造商可能无法满足整体豁免条件。研究结论从纵向约束视角扩充了现有的相关市场界定理论,也为中国汽车行业的整体豁免规制政策探索提供参考。 It constructed a demand model of discrete choice and a vertical oligopoly competition model.Based on the Shanghai automobile market transaction data from 2005 to 2016,it tested the impact of the vertical market structure on the relevant market theoretically and empirically according to the SSNIP test method defined by the anti-monopoly related market.The results show that the use of the SSNIP test in the longitudinally constrained case tends to define a wider relevant market than the linear two-margin case.Using the empirical framework of the vertical oligopoly competition model to deal with the practical problem that wholesale prices cannot be observed,it also attempted to characterize the relevant market by vehicle model and production area.With reference to the EU’s block exemption policy,some automakers may not be able to meet the block exemption conditions.The research findings expand the existing relevant market definition theories from the perspective of vertical constraints,and also provide a reference for the exploration of the overall exemption regulation policy of China’s auto industry.
作者 张军 ZHANG Jun(Institute of Economics,Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences,Nanjing 210001,China)
出处 《研究与发展管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2022年第6期28-41,共14页 R&D Management
基金 国家社会科学基金一般项目“数字经济下商业信用影响实体经济高质量发展的微观机理研究”(21BJL035)。
关键词 需求替代 纵向约束 相关市场界定 demand substitution vertical restraint relevant market definition
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